Democracy, Liberalism and the Middle East : On the Universality of Liberal Democracy by Foseide, Bente Troøyen
Democracy, Liberalism and          
the Middle East 
On the Universality of Liberal Democracy 
Bente Troøyen Foseide  
 
Master Thesis in 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
Spring 2008 
  
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2
Preface 
 The field of academia is an intriguing place to be. The academic world allows room 
for abstract ideas, theories and thoughts fascinating for those who take part in it. Being a 
student of both philosophy and political science I have many times let my self reflect upon 
ideas and possible solutions to complex problems by mixing philosophical ideals with 
political realities. I believe these fields of study are inextricably linked. Even though 
academic can be defined as theoretical or irrelevant for direct, practical purposes, outcomes 
from academic production have something to say to the world outside the university. I 
especially find the relation between theory and practice important with regards to philosophy 
and political science and its relevance to policy makers. If all politicians were trained in 
those disciplines, the public debate might have sounded a little differently. Terms derived 
from political philosophical theory would be used more cautiously, and not merely thrown 
out to erroneously accuse someone for being a ‘liberal’ or an ‘Islamist’ for the sake of 
polarizing the debate. Another consequence would be that certain political problems could 
have been solved in a different manner when the contending sides acknowledge their 
agreement on fundamental ideas.  
This thesis is an attempt to combine philosophy and political science in order to raise 
important questions and debates relevant for the practitioner in the diplomatic areas of peace 
and conflict. My initial project was to examine the Middle Eastern exceptionalism when it 
comes to democratization. What inspired me to do so was an event that happened abroad in 
the fall 2004. When I was an exchange student in political science at McGill University in 
Canada, one of the professors gave an extremely interesting lecture about democracy in the 
Middle East. He compared the region’s government to the Western European and North 
American mature democracies, and to the new democracies in former colonies of Latin 
America. The causal explanations for why democracy was more or less consolidated in other 
regions of the world, where many, but when it came to the Middle East, the professor could 
not give an adequate answer. Many theories of democratization fall short when explaining its 
failure to succeed in the Arab world. My final project has been to critically discuss the 
universality of democracy in the first place, and thereafter analyze a selection of the 
explanations looking at certain preconditions for democracy and how an ideological transfer 
of liberal democracy is challenging in the Arab authoritarian context. I do not claim to give 
an answer to the puzzle, but rather a contributing piece.  
I would like to thank my supervisor Lene Bomann-Larsen for all your helpful 
suggestions and comments, my brothers Arnt Olav and Vegard Foseide for correcting my 
English and my family and friends for believing in me and my project. I appreciate all the 
interesting discussions we have had on the topic. Finally I would like to thank my beloved 
Knut for being there for me and encouraging me during my time of writing this thesis. It 
would not have been possible without your help. 
 
Oslo, May 13th 2008  
Bente Troøyen Foseide 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Thematic introduction: The universality of democracy 
and freedom 
Democratization has the last few decades become a widely used strategy 
among Western foreign policy makers and international organizations as a tool for 
building global peace and sustainable development. The process of democratization is 
closely linked to the notion of state-building and liberal peace-building among 
practitioners using the concepts. Democratic practice is generally assumed to create 
political liberty, stability and prosperity. A good society needs more than anything 
else to be able to grant its citizens individual freedom through the right to express 
their opinions freely, to actively participate in the politics of their country, and to 
equally join in the decision-making of who is to govern their state. The rule of law is 
a precondition for such a society. A democratic system of governing, where the 
politics is guided by the will of the people is expected to provide human rights and 
political freedoms to its citizens. There is no clear recipe for a democratic system, and 
no universally accepted single, perfect form of democracy. That is why we 
experience such variety of democratic practices carried out in so many different states 
in all corners of the world. It is still a system in testing, and we are in want of 
workable solutions of which type of democratic practice serves the well-being of a 
society and its citizens.  
Some argue that the concept of liberal democracy is an uncontested ideal and 
its claim to universality is justified, therefore it is highly debated and is a concept that 
should not be regarded as a guarantee for peace and freedom. Whatever one may 
think about liberal democracy, democracy without the ‘liberal’ prefix remains 
unchallenged in the current governments of today’s regimes and in scholarly 
literature. No political system is deemed to better grant people political rights, civil 
liberties and long term individual freedom. The Finnish professor in political science, 
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Tatu Vanhanen, expresses the consensus saying that “democracy provides a better 
framework for human life than do autocratic political systems.”1  
The good governance projects supported through the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) all promote democracy as the best and foremost political 
system there is. A democratic government is what in the eyes of UNDP and USAID 
equals good governance and best can distribute wealth and aid among a state’s 
citizens. USAID is very clear on their strategic objective in their promotion of 
democracy, and legitimize their work for liberalization through democracy on the 
claim that “people throughout the world have demonstrated by their own actions that 
freedom is a universal concept.”2 Hence it follows in their argumentation that through 
political and economic liberalization, freedom will be granted. USAID and the US 
Department of State’s grand mission in their Strategic Plan for 2007-2012 with the 
subtitle “Transformational Diplomacy” is to  
“advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international 
community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and 
prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the need of their 
people, reduce widespread poverty and act responsibly within the international 
system.”3      
Promoting freedom, democracy and reducing poverty go hand in hand in the US 
foreign assistance. In the same document we can read how US policy is “committed 
to peace and security, democracy, free markets and economic integration, a healthy 
environment, and humanitarian assistance”4 and how President Bush puts forth US 
ambitions of supporting “the growth of democratic movements and institutions in 
 
1 Vanhanen, Tatu: Democratization, p.1 
2 “USAID’s Strategies for Sustainable Development: Building Democracy”, quoted in Larbi Sadiki The Search for Arab 
Democracy, p.340 
3 US Department of State, US Agency for International Diplomacy: Strategic Plan, p.2 
4 Ibid. p.44 
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every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”5 In 
order for political and economic liberalization to happen, it requires the establishment 
of democracy and through the policy of the USAID, liberalization becomes identical 
with democratization.   
A non-profit, nonpartisan independent American organization named Freedom 
House annually conducts a survey on the level of freedom in the world. Freedom 
House too puts an equation mark between liberal democracy and freedom. Their 
assumption is that “freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democracies.”6 
Freedom House does research to see whether or not countries have free elections, 
political pluralism and participation, as well as how rights and social freedoms are 
enjoyed by individuals. If all their criteria are met, they range a country as free. Semi-
democracies are rated as partly free and autocratic regimes are rated as not free. This 
can be used as an indicator for how the Western world views its own democratic 
practice, with all citizens as free, participating decision makers with substantial 
political rights and civil liberties, as the ideal political governing system. The 
question is then, if this understanding of democracy should be exported to all corners 
of the world within the diversity of societies that exist. It seems likely that non-
pluralistic, non-secular societies can have a different democratic practice than 
Western, pluralist and secular societies. When defenders of democracy uncritically 
rely on Eurocentric definitions of democracy, or the orientalist worry about the 
defense of individualism and secularism as prerequisites for democracy, it does not 
show a debate where the contending sides are concerned with particularities or open 
to local variations.7 Democracy has to be ‘defoundationalized’ if it is to be relevant 
for the multitude of world cultures and peoples who are striving to establish good 
governance in their societies, Larbi Sadiki claims in his extensive analysis of 
 
5 Ibid. p.4  
6 Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007. The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, p. 982 
7 Argument inspired by Larbi Sadiki 
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discourses and counter-discourses on Arab democracy titled “The Search for Arab 
Democracy.”8 By ‘defoundationalizing’ democracy, Sadiki means refiguring, 
rethinking and reimagining democracy as an ‘anti-foundationalist’ ethos that does not 
regard democracy to be fixed, singular and self-evidently superior. Anti-
foundationalism rejects ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism and Western cultural 
imperialism because it opposes the Western self-appointed truth of liberal democracy 
as the legitimate source of norms of political practice.9 This thesis will argue along 
the lines of defoundationalizing democracy, however, in a less radical manner in the 
sense that it presupposes certain fundamental values required in a democracy.  
According to Sadiki, no concept is more on the agenda of discussion than 
democracy; What is democracy? Which democracy? Whose democracy? are central 
questions raised by Sadiki. More important for the purpose of this paper is Sadiki’s 
question of whether or not it is possible for a concept, an ideal and a system that 
obtains almost universal interest to have any claim to singular applicability. Is 
democracy a singular or a pluralistic concept? If democracy is the best form of 
government for all countries, no matter their cultural background, ethnical 
homogeneity, political history and level of economic development, in what form shall 
it be introduced – does it have many forms that are equally good or is there only one 
universal form of democracy? Historically the discourse around democracy has 
revolved around what the best form of government is and not so much on how we can 
understand the concept differently in different contexts, especially when exporting it 
to currently non-democratic societies. This paper aims to focus on the latter. 
1.1.1 Contesting Democracy 
The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said in a speech to the House of 
Commons in 1947 that:” Democracy is the worst form of government, except all 
 
8 Sadiki, Larbi: The Search for Arab Democracy, p.2 
9 Ibid., p.53-63 
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those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”10 No one pretends 
democracy is perfect or all-wise, he continued, “but there is the broad feeling in our 
country that the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, 
expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of 
Ministers who are their servants and not their masters.”11 The essence of our 
classical, traditional understanding of a democracy is an idealistic notion of s
Democracy is a system of government designed to let the people participate, 
influence and join in politics and governing. The word democracy derives from the 
Greek demokratia meaning ‘rule by the people’ in its literal sense, where every man 
can act best and live happily, according to Aristotle. The Athenian democracy was 
patriarchal and excluded slaves, foreigners and women. So the Athenian demokratia 
only vaguely resembles our notion of liberal democracy in the modern world.12 
Athenian democracy never possessed direct systems of sovereign citizens and 
representative governments. There was a great gap between the philosophers who 
constructed the term and the public they constructed it for. This discrepancy between 
concept and reality also exists to some extent today among policy makers who are 
imposing democracy on non-liberal societies. This is actualized in the way Western 
foreign policy makers sit in their offices and headquarters in the rich part of the world 
deciding on democratic reforms in poorer, less developed countries as if state 
sovereignty had no validity what so ever and the citizens were not familiar with the 
practices of liberal democracy. If the overall aim of Western foreign policy makers is 
to create a world community of liberal democratic states, their credibility in this quest 
becomes significantly lower when their political approach seems undemocratic in 
itself.   
 
10 Churchill, Winston: House of Commons speech November, 1947 
11 Baltzersen, J.K.: “Churchill on democracy revisited”, 2005 
12 Dahl, Robert A.: Democracy and Its Critics, p.360 
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1.2 Presentation of Thesis 
1.2.1 Aim of thesis 
This thesis aims to present a critical assessment of the universality of the 
concept of liberal democracy based on perspectives from classical philosophy and 
political science. I will examine how Western democracy promotion is received in the 
Middle East and North Africa.13 The region has a highly authoritarian history and has 
yet to change considerably in order for the states to strengthen their peoples’ rights 
and freedoms. My analysis of the case of the Middle East has implications to how 
universal the notion of liberal democracy is to be understood. I will argue that one of 
the obstacles to bringing freedom to the people of the Middle East is that democracy 
is – on the part of the promoters- based on a universalization of Western values, and 
on the part of the receivers, construed as a Western ideal. Furthermore, it can be 
difficult for the Arabs to adapt to the ideas inherent in the classical liberalist tradition, 
which are integrated in the Western understanding of liberal democracy. Thus one 
contribution to the future prospects for political change in the region may be to 
reconstruct the notion of democracy and freedom in a way that is less biased by 
Western values and more open to local interpretations. One way of doing this might 
be to separate certain ideals within liberalism from the practices necessary for a 
democracy, such as readjusting the role of individualism and secularism. 
As democracy promotion has become a ‘big business’ for international 
organizations and foreign policy makers, it is especially interesting to examine the 
Western actors’ role in the ongoing democratization efforts in the Middle East in 
general, and the way democracy promotion is received specifically. I want to examine 
how the Western classical view of liberal democracy fits into the Middle Eastern 
context. Moreover, I will suggest that the Western values baked into the concept of 
liberal democracy may partially explain the region’s resistance to Western democracy 
 
13 See chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.3 for exact definition of the Middle East. 
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promotion, as a part of the general hostility to ideology imported from the West. My 
main research question is thus:  What are the challenges of exporting the Western 
classical view of liberal democracy to the Middle Eastern context?  
This question generates three sub-questions which will be treated in the subsequent 
chapters of the thesis: 
1) What separates liberal democracy from alternative understandings of 
democracy?  
2) What is the current position of democracy in the Middle East?  
3) What are the future prospects for political change in the region?  
1.3 Contextual introduction 
1.3.1 Authoritarianism in the Middle East  
The Middle East and North Africa is historically and to present day the region 
in the world where there are fewest established democratic states. In fact, Oliver 
Schlumberger claims that “no single Arab country has ever reached a state in which 
its polity could reasonably be considered ‘democratic’.”14 The Arab states have for 
centuries resisted the international pressure for democracy and continued their 
authoritarian, hierarchical, patron-client, family dynasty dominated political rule.15  
  The oil producing countries in the Middle East enjoy prosperity, valuable 
natural resources, a high level of education and development, yet they do not succeed 
in consolidating democracy. Given that some of these factors are believed to be 
preconditions for democratic implementation, economic development in particular, 
 
14 Schlumberger, Oliver: “Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts” in 
Dietrich Jung (ed.): Democratization and Development, p.36 
15 For further references on patrimonialism and authoritarianism, Eva Bellin: “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the 
Middle East. Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective” in Comparative Politics, 2004 and for more on clientelism and 
resisting international pressure see Maye Kassem: Egyptian Politics. The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule” 
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the weak position of democracy in the regions stands as a paradox.16 There seems to 
be little political will among leaders in the Middle East to promote democratic 
practice. This could be explained through numerous causes, for instance the lack of 
historical experience of democratic rule in Arab countries, the strong political role of 
religion, the incompatibility between liberal ideals and Islamic values or the hostility 
towards Western ideas and concepts.17  
1.3.2 Structure of thesis 
The topic at hand is quite large, and a number of possible explanatory models 
are available for analyzing the problems of exporting democracy to the Middle East. 
This thesis does not aim to review all possible explanations, but seeks one possible 
answer in the concept of liberal democracy as a universal ideal, and assesses the 
particularities of the Middle Eastern context in the light of this. In order to conduct an 
adequate analysis and discussion about the universality of liberal democracy and its 
challenging adaptation to the Middle East, I will first present an overview of the 
classical philosophical views on liberal democracy. Second, I will provide an account 
of the current position of democracy in the Middle East. Having outlined the 
theoretical framework for the essay, I will discuss some of the challenges liberals face 
when exporting their values to the Arab context and analyze a selection of central 
explanations for the lack of democratic practice in the region. Finally I will look at 
what the literature says on strategies for Western democracy promotion and future 
prospects for political change.  
 
16 See Seymor Martin Lipset: Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics, p.31 and  Ronald Inglehart: “Changing Values, 
Economic Development and Political Change “ in International Social Science Journal No.145, 1999 
17 See Homa Katouzian: Iranian History and Politics and Kjetil Selvik: “Demokratiproblemet i Midtøsten” in NUPI report 
21, Hvor hender det? , 2007 on historical explanations, see Larbi Sadiki : The Search for Arab democracy”  and Robin 
Wright: “ Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation”  in Journal of Democracy7:.2, 1996 on the strong 
political power of religion and see Barry Rubin: The Long War for Freedom for hostility towards Western ideas and 
concepts. 
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1.3.3 Expectations, limitations and discussion 
Based on my following analysis of the challenges of the ideological transfer of 
democracy, I expect to find evidence suggesting that there is a need for a new 
understanding of the concept of democracy. There is a need to critically discuss the 
ideal that one type of political system is universally valid and optimal for all different 
kinds of societies. Could it be that a pluralistic, secular Western society needs a 
different kind of democratic practice than a society in the Arab world where religion 
plays such a vital role? The universal application of substantive social, economic and 
political arrangements from liberal principles is indeed something that ought to be 
debated. I will suggest that the idea of democratizing the illiberal parts of the world 
often amounts to an attempt to apply a presumed universally valid concept of liberal 
democracy.  A criticism of the politics and the rationale behind democratization gives 
fuel to the debate in international political theory between ‘liberals’ or moral 
universalists on the one hand, and ‘communitarians’ who are moral particularists, on 
the other. Communitarianism and liberalism, the latter often associated with 
‘cosmopolitanism’, have various implications for different societies. Certain well-
functioning societies can with confidence acknowledge that they want other societies 
to be like them and claim that is the best for all, while others find themselves 
unpleased with their current situation and think that their needs are different from the 
needs of other societies. One example could be that a society of laws and regulations 
gives individual freedom in one contextual setting, while it deprives citizen rights and 
liberties in another. While ‘negative freedom’ could be an ideal in Western, secular 
and multicultural societies, where citizens desire freedom from barriers or constraints, 
‘positive freedom’ might be more wanted in the Middle East where people often are 
unified in a common perception of what constitutes ‘the public good’, and which is to 
be administered by the rulers.18 This springs from the Western history of the rule of 
law making citizens used to the adaptation to democratically elected laws and the 
 
18 Sadiki, Larbi: The Search for Arab Democracy, p.224 
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legitimacy of Islam that has the authority to establish what the common good for a 
Muslim public is. 
Setting aside the religious and philosophical aspects of democratization in the 
Middle East, we can look at the political factors necessary for change. Some 
countries in the region may have the external conditions and framework required for 
democratic practice, but the individual freedom for all citizens and decision makers is 
still not granted. Our challenge then is how to reconceptualize democracy and 
democracy promotion to successfully consolidate democracy in a Middle Eastern 
authoritarian context. 
1.3.4 Choice of approach  
The approach used in this thesis will be a review of scholarly literature as well 
as selected reports and articles from the media discourse on the topic of 
democratizing the Middle East analyzed with my research question both as a point of 
departure and as a guidance for direction a long the way. This thesis seeks to collect, 
compare and evaluate central theories and hypotheses within the field of classical 
political philosophy and political science regarding democracy and its contextual 
challenges in the Middle East.  
 The thesis will primarily be based on central liberal theories from a classical 
philosophical point of view supporting the idea of liberal democracy. Philosophers 
chosen for this purpose are John Stuart Mill and John Rawls and their works on 
liberalism and liberal democracy. Political scientists having done studies on 
democratization and democratic transition will serve as secondary sources, like Tatu 
Vanhanen,19 Robert Dahl,20 S.M. Lipset.21 For empirical data on the current situation 
 
19 Vanhanen, Tatu: Democratization 
20 Dahl, Robert: Democracy and Its Critics and Polyarchy – Participation and Opposition 
21 Lipset, S.M: Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics 
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for democracy, development and human rights in the Middle East, I will use Freedom 
House,22 United Nations Development Programme23 and Human Rights Watch.24 On 
the subject of criticism to democratization and strategies for democracy promotion, 
Jean Grugel,25 Dietrich Jung,26 and Larry Diamond27 will give valuable insights. 
Larbi Sadiki,28 Homa Katouzian,29 Muqtedar Khan30 and Maye Kassem31 will be the 
main writers representing the Middle Eastern perspective on the democratic 
discourse. 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2007 
23 UNDP: The Arab Human Development Reports 2002-2005 and Human Development Reports 2006 and 2007/2008 
24 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2008 
25 Grugel, Jean: Democratization. A Critical Introduction 
26 Jung, Dietrich: Democratization and Development. New Political Strategies for The Middle East 
27 Diamond, Larry: “Is the Third Wave Over?” in Journal of Democracy 7:3 
28 Sadiki, Larbi: The Search for Arab Democracy. The Dialectic of State and Society 
29 Katouzian, Homa: Iranian History and Politics 
30 Khan, Muqtedar: “Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of the U.S. Policy” in Middle East Policy, Vol.X, 2003 
31 Kassem, Maye: Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule 
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2. Liberal Democracy and Democracy Promotion 
2.1 The Western classical view 
First it is necessary to clarify what the Western classical view of liberal 
democracy is, which will enable me to answer the question of what separates liberal 
democracy from other understandings of democracy. The following will give a 
descriptive account of the classical view of liberal democracy from a classical 
philosophical point of view, mainly based on the Western liberal philosophers John 
Stuart Mill and John Rawls. The aim of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical 
foundation of the modern view of liberal democracy and look at what gives 
democracy the extra label ‘liberal’. The chapter will include a clarification of 
concepts, a presentation of classical and modern liberalism and the common 
understanding of the notion of liberal democracy, and eventually a discussion about 
the rationale behind democracy promotion. I will examine which values Westerners 
export to the rest of the world under the policy of democracy promotion. This value-
analysis will be used later on to discuss the challenges of exporting the Western 
values to non-democratic societies.  
2.2 Clarification of concepts: 
2.2.1 Defining democracy 
The terms democracy, democratization and democracy promotion are at the 
centre of my discussion and will be clarified here and discussed in detail later. The 
first and most important term we need to have a clear understanding of, is democracy. 
The political scientist Robert A. Dahl describes a democratic state as one being able 
to consider all citizens as politically equal, and have a government that is 
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continuously responsive to the preferences of its citizens.32 Dahl puts a great 
emphasis on equality and the importance of citizen participation and public 
contestation which he regards as crucial characteristics for democracy.  Democracy, 
Dahl proposes, is to be measured according to eight criteria which have widespread 
support. Those are: 1) the right to vote, 2) the right to be elected, 3) the right of 
political leaders to compete for support and votes, 4) free and fair elections, 5) 
freedom of association, 6) freedom of expression, 7) alternative sources of 
information and 8) institutions for making public policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preferences.33 These are the fundamental qualities that need to be 
fulfilled if a state is to be called democratic. However, there is a high degree of 
conceptual confusion about the term democracy. The political scientists David Collier 
and Steven Levitsky identify over 550 ‘subtypes’ of democracy.34 Minimalist 
definitions of democracy have also been established, for comparative purposes, 
among others. Joseph Schumpeter defines democracy as a system “for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”35 This minimalist definition, which 
identifies electoral competition as the essence of democracy, is termed electoral 
democracy and is common among Western policy makers who track and celebrate 
the expansion of democracy. Electoral democracy is a minimalist conception opposed 
to the more including term liberal democracy which requires fundamental civil 
freedoms as necessary in order to make competition and participation real and 
meaningful.  
A liberal democracy, in contrast to an electoral democracy, has to have free, 
fair and regular electoral competition which includes all groups, as well as a political 
 
32 Dahl, Robert A.: Polyarchy- Participation and Opposition, p.1. 
33 Ibid. p.3, Arend Ljiphart: Patterns of democracy, p.48-49 
34 Collier and  Levitsky cited in Larry Diamond: ”Is the third wave over?” in  Journal of democracy 7.3, 1996, p.21  
35 Schumpeter quoted in ibid. 
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opposition which grants that the outcome of the election is open. All citizens at full 
age (18) have the right to vote.36 Real power should lay with the elected officials and 
the executive power is constrained. All officeholders are accountable to one another. 
No cultural, ethnic, religious or any other minority group is prohibited from 
expressing their interests in the political process. Citizens have unrestricted access to 
an independent media and multiple channels for expression and representation. 
Individuals have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, 
publication, assembly, demonstration and petition. There is a rule of law and all 
citizens are politically equal under the law. These are the essential features of a liberal 
democracy given by Larry Diamond.37 According to him, the best available empirical 
indicator of ‘liberal democracy’ is the ‘free’ rating in Freedom House.38 
When using democracy in the following, I will refer to a system of 
government where there is popular sovereignty and the right to vote is given to all 
persons over a certain age. Democratic governing is guided by a rule of law treating 
individuals as politically equal subjects before the law. There should be 
representation through periodic free, fair and competitive elections where the results 
are not fixed in advance. Citizens ought to be free to express their views in public, 
form associations with each other and be able to actively participate in politics and 
decision-making processes. In that way, one can ensure that the politics is guided by 
the will of the people. A real democracy is expected to provide these possibilities, 
fundamental rights and freedoms to its citizens.39 I further take it as a given that all 
humans are universally entitled to those equal rights and freedoms that are expressed 
in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The universal human 
 
36 Liberal democracies have universal suffrage with some specified and justified restrictions such as immigrants without 
citizenship, those declared incompetent or those who have been convicted for serious criminal offences.  
37 Diamond, Larry: ”Is the Third Wave over?” in Journal of Democracy 7:3, 1996, p.22-23 
38 Ibid.,p.24  
39 See Introduction 
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rights ought to serve as fundamental cornerstones for every democratic society that 
deserves its name.  
2.2.2 Democratization and democracy promotion 
In addition to his requirements for democracy, Dahl lays out five criteria for a 
democratic process, illuminating how his definitions of democracy and 
democratization are connected. The five assumptions that justify a democratic 
political order are in his view 1) effective participation, 2) voting equality at the 
decisive stage 3) enlightened understanding 4) control of the agenda and 5) the 
inclusion of adults.40 The terms democratization and democracy promotion might be 
used interchangeably, but the distinction is made with actual implementation and 
value-exportation. Democratization in its original use means the political action of an 
authoritarian state transforming into a consolidated democracy or, put in another way 
the transition from non-democratic to democratic forms of government,41 while 
democracy promotion entails the idea of exporting democratic values to other non-
democratic countries. I choose to define democracy promotion as having little to do 
with the actual implementation of state reforms in another country, but rather the 
ideological transfer of values from one democratic state to a non-democratic one. 
Political researcher on authoritarianism in the Middle East and Northern Africa, 
Oliver Schlumberger, describes democracy promotion as promoting democratic 
governance and initiate political reform in a number of areas, like:  
-Strengthening respect for human rights, including women’s rights and the rights of 
the child (support for compliance with human rights and conventions) 
-Civil and political rights such as freedom of the media, the right to participate 
actively in public and political life, mainly through competitive elections, eligibility 
for public office, and the like (support for democratic elections and the preconditions 
of their being meaningful, i.e., enhancing participation) 
 
40 Dahl, Robert A. : Democracy and Its Critics, p.111 
41 Sodaro, Michael J.: Comparative Politics, p.19 
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-Strengthening the opportunities for the voluntary association of citizens for 
purposes of public interest, and facilitating their inclusion in decision-making 
processes in public affairs (support for civil society) 
-Support for an independent judiciary, for the equitable application of laws, and 
citizen’s access to the judicial system (support for judicial independence and the rule 
of law) 
- Avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of a few and bringing “the state” 
closer to its citizens not in the sense of being a controller, but as being a service 
provider, especially to the poor and those remote from the central decision-making 
circles (support for political, administrative and fiscal decentralization) 42 
All of these issues are important for democracy promoters, which in a more general 
sense also include strengthening accountability, transparency and combating 
corruption. Schlumberger notes that although the list is not exhaustive, it makes up 
the key dimensions of democracy and is compatible to the typical definitions of 
democracy noted above. A state can fulfill some, but not all of these standards, and 
still earn the title democracy, although not a liberal democracy. When gathering all 
these individual elements, they make up a functioning democracy with important 
liberal elements like respect for human rights, freedom of expression, associational 
freedom, and an independent judiciary and constrains of power, similar to those 
liberal democracies known from Western Europe and North America.43  Societies 
lacking many of these central elements of political institutions respecting human 
rights, enhancing political participation, providing political rights and civil liberties 
for their citizens are accordingly called non-liberal societies or authoritarian 
regimes. The legislative and judiciary power of authoritarian regimes is often weak 
and constrained, while the executive power has few limitations and lacks a system of 
checks and balances securing a certain degree of transparency and accountability. 
 
42 Schlumberger, Oliver: ”Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts” in 
Dietrich Jung  (ed.): Democratization and Development, p. 40-41 
43 Ibid.,p.41 
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2.2.3 The West and the rest 
That brings us to the next concepts in need of clarification, namely the West 
and Western. These are terms frequently used in the democratic discourse, and some 
scholars refer to democratization as a form of Westernization. In this thesis, West and 
Western is defined in geo-political terms referring to the Western part of the world, 
the Anglophone countries of North America, Australia, New Zealand as well as the 
various countries of Western Europe. West is also used to describe democratic 
political systems in secular, pluralistic and liberal societies, as opposed to several 
non-Western countries where democratic governments not yet have proved to be 
solid. The Middle East refers to the countries in the region that encompasses the Arab 
states in Southwest Asia and the Maghreb countries and Egypt in Northern Africa 
from Morocco in the west to Iran in the east.44 I choose to include Iran and Turkey 
when referring to the ‘Arab states’, even though the majority of the population in Iran 
is Persian and Turkey consist of a Turkish majority and a large Kurdish minority. Iran 
and Turkey are often included in the contemporary usage of the Middle East because 
of their similar geopolitical and religious interests to the Arab countries in the region. 
Arabic Middle East or what we call the Arab world will be used interchangeably 
when referring to Arab states, a term which excludes Israel. 
2.2.4 Conceptions of liberty   
The final concepts to be clarified, is the philosophical distinction within the 
tradition of liberalism between negative and positive liberty.45 This distinction is 
relevant for my later treatment of different political ideals of freedom in Western and 
Arab societies, and the liberty concept found in political liberalism. Negative liberty 
means absence of barriers, constraints and obstacles in the pursuit of liberty. Positive 
 
44 The Middle East and North Africa include 21 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. See “Defining the Middle East” in Dan Smith: The State of the Middle East, p.8-9 
45 The distinction between ’positive’ and ’negative’ freedom was first proposed by Thomas H. Green, and later restated by 
Isaiah Berlin in his essay: ”Two Concepts of Liberty” (1958) 
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liberty is the possibility of acting in such a way as to take control of one’s life and 
realize one’s fundamental purposes. While negative liberty refers to, among other 
meanings, freedom from doing something because certain hindrances restrain your 
freedom, positive liberty can be said to refer to the opposite, which is freedom to do 
something because you have the opportunity to do so. The pursuit of liberty can 
under both aspects be understood as self-realization or self-determination. Western 
liberals tend to favor a negative concept of freedom, and generally claim that state 
interference should be strongly limited, something that affects the relation to 
democratic rule.46 
2.3 Examining the notion ‘liberal democracy’ 
When describing Western democratic political systems, the notion liberal 
democracy is frequently used. ‘Liberal’ in this sense refers to regimes that are ‘free’, 
‘secular’ or ‘non-restrictive’ in its popular meaning. The label liberal democracy has 
usually been given to societies within the Western world, but the number of free 
countries in the world is expanding and many new (third-wave) electoral democracies 
are developing in a liberal direction. We find some liberal democracies in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, and Israel in the Middle East, but the most popular 
illustrating examples of liberal democracies, are Australia, Canada, the member states 
of the European Union, Iceland, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and the United 
States. The practices of these countries’ political representation, electoral systems and 
governmental interference in the private sphere, are varying. Nevertheless, they all 
possess some common features that classify them specifically as liberal democracies. 
These democratic and liberal societal elements are the results of a long history of 
philosophical, cultural, economical and political development. Drawing the historical 
line from the classic philosophical tradition on democratic and liberal thinking, is a 
 
46 Berlin, Isaiah: Liberty, p.176-178   
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useful aid in our search for understanding the values held in modern, liberal 
democracies.  
2.3.1 Classical liberalism 
  The root of the word liberalism derives from Latin liber meaning free, 
indicating the primary thought of this particular political philosophy. The origin of 
liberal democracy stems from the classical philosophical tradition of liberalism in the 
eighteenth century and the thoughts of among others John Stuart Mill. The system of 
thoughts behind liberal democracy was modernized by the twentieth century 
philosopher John Rawls and his principles of justice and ideas on modern political 
liberalism, to which I will return. John Stuart Mill’s work was rooted on the British 
empiricism of John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume and utilitarianism as 
we know it from Jeremy Bentham. Mill developed his own defense of empiricism 
and a liberal political view of society and culture. His main work On Liberty from 
1859 transformed the concept of liberty into philosophy and gave it a central role in 
social policy and government. Mill’s overall aim in his philosophical project is to 
develop a positive view of the human being’s place in the universe, and contribute to 
the progress of human knowledge, human well-being and individual freedom. Mill 
strongly defends the idea of the free and sovereign individual; “Over himself, over 
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”47 Mill proclaims.      
Two fundamental problems are addressed within the traditional schools of 
liberalism: The examination of the concepts of liberty and right, and secondly the 
justification of the state’s functions, especially the limits of the use of coercive, 
legitimate force.   
 
47 Mill, John Stuart: On Liberty, p.69 
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2.3.2 Individual freedom as the highest value 
The first problem in liberalist tradition revolves around the scope, content and 
analysis of the individual rights. The individual has the right to be free from coercion, 
crime, violence or other obstacles or constraints to its exercise of liberty.  The 
fundamental presupposition of liberal freedom tends to be a negative conception of 
freedom, seeing liberty as the absence of coercion or interference by others. If you are 
prevented from doing what you otherwise do, you are to that degree un-free. The 
liberal state’s commitment to protect individual liberty then becomes solely to make 
sure citizens do not coerce or interfere with one another. Many liberals also posit a 
positive conception of liberty as freedom to act according to one’s own will or pursue 
one’s own interest in an autonomous way. The ideal of freedom as self-determination 
has its roots in classical liberalism, from among others Mill’s On Liberty, where he so 
eloquently states that “the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing 
our own good in our own way (…).”48 Every individual has the freedom to pursue 
one’s interests to the extent that it would not deprive others to do the same.   
To John Stuart Mill, liberty means freedom of self from state or governmental 
restrictions. The right to liberty is the fundamental human right. Liberalism has taken 
many forms and competing visions, but a liberal is by definition someone who 
believes in liberty, and holds liberty as the highest political value. The fundamental 
principle of liberalism is that freedom is normatively basic and the a priori 
assumption is in favor of freedom, so it is not in need of any justification, Mill 
argued. The burden of proof lies with those who wish to limit freedom, especially 
with coercive means. It follows from this that political authority and the rule of law 
must be justified, because they both limit the liberty of citizens. John Rawls agrees 
with this fundamental liberal principle that freedom is normatively basic and that 
governmental actions need to be justified. Rawls developed further the influential 
social contract theory as one way of justifying the limitations of freedom and 
 
48 Ibid. p. 72 
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equality.49 Philosophers of the social contract theory hold that persons’ political 
obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement between them to form 
society. Human beings are rational and self-interested, and will therefore choose to 
submit to a political authority in order to be able to promote their own interests. 
Rawls further developed this theory by means of principles of justice demarcates how 
we can construct political legitimacy in the first place, and what such a constitution 
can and cannot require of us. 
2.3.3 The justification of political authority 
The second problem addressed within the traditional school of liberalism is the 
justification of the state’s functions.  I will first look at the liberal point of view of 
whether or not we need a state and thereafter which role the state should play. 
Liberals claim that there is a need for a state in order to ensure that people do not 
violate each other’s rights, for example through violence. The problem is that the 
state can only fulfill its task efficiently by exercising force. Liberals respond to this 
by saying that state sanctioned force is the lesser evil and that the exercise of state-
force must be regulated by common laws so that it can be predicted and controlled. A 
state’s actions can unjustifiably limit the liberty of its citizens, but political authority 
is justified in the sense that liberalism emphasizes that it is the basic task of the state 
to protect the equal liberty of all its citizens, also minorities within the state. Rawls 
expressed this task in his first principle of justice called ‘The Liberty Principle’ in 
Political Liberalism:”Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for 
all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be 
guaranteed their fair value.”50 The liberalist can not be in favor of anarchy, because 
he sees the state as necessary to ensure that the individual’s right is not offended by 
 
49 Earlier thinkers of what later formed liberal political theory from the seventeenth and eighteenth century are Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. They were all founders and adherents of the social 
contract theory. 
50 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p.5. Principle revised from the original given in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, 1971. 
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any other individual.  This can be done with a certain portion of monopolized use of 
force, so it is fair to say that liberalism refers to a system of government that 
guarantees freedom for all. 
2.4 Limitations of the state 
Liberals generally claim that if one favors individual liberty one should place 
strong limitations on the activities of the state. The classical liberal point of view is 
that the state’s only task is to ensure that fundamental rights are not violated. Another 
liberal point of view is that the state can do certain service-functions on top of its 
fundamental task; if it can perform them better than the free market. Rawls advocates 
this view by saying that the liberal state should lead an active distribution politics.51 
This envisions a positive view of freedom as the pursuit of the good and seeking own 
self-realization, where a welfare state can aid its citizens through systems of health 
care, social security and education for all.  
2.4.1 Mill and Walzer on the limitations of the state 
Mill declares that men are never allowed to interfere with the liberty of action 
for others unless it is in self-protection. This he calls ‘one very simple principle.’52 
Mill’s reason for writing this doctrine of liberty was that he feared a new form of 
tyranny was confronting mankind. That was not the tyranny of despotism, but the 
’tyranny of the majority’, 53 which was becoming prominent both in politics and 
social life. Mill was concerned about the rise of popular government and saw it as a 
precondition for the new form of ‘despotism of custom’. In his eyes the society itself 
 
51 Rawls, John: Law of Peoples  
52 Mill, John Stuart: On Liberty, p.68 
53 Ibid. p.62 
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may become a tyrant because it has a tendency to impose “its own ideas and practices 
as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them”.54  
The American political philosopher Michael Walzer holds a similar view of 
the state as being tyrannical in his Spheres of Justice where he discusses the 
limitations of state power and how it is colonized; ”(...) state power is itself 
imperialist; its agents are tyrants in their own right.”55 The agents of state power 
override social meanings, Walzer says. He believes politics to be one of many 
spheres of social activity, and to him, ‘tyrant’ primarily has political connotations.56 
When Mill refers to the society as being a tyrant, he means that the will of the rulers 
becomes more and more identified with the will of the people and that there is a 
strong pressure of conforming to custom.57  Mill explains this danger like this:  
 “The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous or the 
most active part of the people - the majority or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as 
the majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number, and precautions 
are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power”.58 
 That is why the limitation of the government’s power over individuals is 
important, according to Mill. Forms of government are beneficial in the sense that 
they are grounded on the unending interest of man as a progressive being. 
Governments are to be evaluated in terms of their capacity to enable each person to 
exercise and develop her own capacities for higher forms of human happiness. For 
Mill, government is not a matter of natural rights or social contract, as in many other 
forms of liberalism. Government is necessary to contribute to the progressive 
development of the individual, and democracy and representative government is the 
 
54 Ibid. p.63 
55 Walzer, Michael: Spheres of Justice, p.282 
56 Walzer’s writings will be further treated later in this chapter. 
57 Mill, John Stuart: On Liberty, p.136 
58 Ibid.p.62  
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form which best encourages individuality. In his view, democratic governments 
provide moral training and encourage the development of natural human sympathies 
which result in the habit of looking at social questions from an impersonal 
perspective rather than that of self-interest. A part of Mill’s philosophical and 
political project is therefore to make people fit for democracy if government is to be 
stable, and that entails freedom of expression and liberalizing the press to include 
social criticism and encourage political debate so that people can exercise their 
responsibility as a free electorate.  
2.4.2 State and religion 
Liberal democracies are characterized by a separation between state and 
church and a secularization of politics. Most liberal countries have a secular rule 
where politics and religion are not intermixed and where the freedom of belief stands 
very strong. The general view is that religion shall not interfere with the state’s 
domain, and neither shall the state interfere in the religious sphere. The highest 
authority in a liberal democracy is the political leadership, not the church, and those 
who govern are obliged to respect the written laws of the country, not Holy 
Scriptures.  
Rawls favors a separation of church and state, and sees it as necessary for 
reasonable, political rule. He is critical to the capability of those avowing to an 
extensive religious doctrine based on a religious authority like the church or the Bible 
to also “hold a reasonable political conception of justice that supports a constitutional 
democratic society”.59 He sees a clear contradiction between comprehensive religious 
and liberal doctrines, and finds them incompatible when formulating political 
conceptions which should allow for pluralist conceptions of the good. 
 
59 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p.490 
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            Mill, on the other hand, is more sympathetic to religion and favored the idea 
of M. Comte’s ‘Religion of Humanity’,60 but he does not want to institutionalize 
religion in a rigid, hierarchical church. Nor does he want a mix of spiritual and 
temporal authorities and calls for a separation of them. The state has nothing to do 
with the individual’s private religious belief, because freedom of belief has the 
highest priority for Mill. He suggests that some forms of religious practice suppress 
individuality and personal development, so they have no place in the modern, liberal 
world. The relationship between state and religion will be further discussed in chapter 
3, as it can be seen as a major contributing factor to the difficulties of establishing 
liberal democracies in the Arab context. 
2.5 Modern political liberalism 
2.5.1  Theories of justice  
John Rawls has formulated the principle ideas of classic liberalism into a 
political system of thinking and created a new conception of justice that is 
independent of religious, moral or philosophical doctrines. Rawls’ main concern in 
Political Liberalism is “how it is possible that there exists over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines.”61 He suggests that this 
pluralism of doctrines is what characterizes a modern democratic society. Rawls 
wants to say how a well-ordered society where ‘Justice as Fairness’62 prevails is to be 
understood once it is adjusted to the fact of reasonable pluralism. This adjustment 
will allow for a society of greater social justice and liberty with a constitutional 
democratic practice.  
 
60 Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, p.73 
61 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p.4  
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Justice as fairness combines two principles: ‘The Liberty principle’ and ‘the 
Difference principle.’ The liberty principle states that each person has an equal claim 
to basic rights and liberties. The liberty principle has priority over the difference 
principle.63 The difference principle regards social and economic inequalities, and 
claims that in order to be justified, inequalities should satisfy two conditions: “first, 
they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society.”64 The difference principle could also be used to 
argue for a global distributive justice where aid is given to governments that are 
unable to protect human rights for economic reasons, in order to help them to ensure 
the maintenance of liberal or decent political institutions.65 Rawls himself does not 
support this universal application of the difference principle, because states are self-
sufficient. Global distributive justice is only relevant as a means to serve the 
expansion of political liberalism globally. 
   In Rawls’ opinion, a well-ordered society of reasonable pluralism consists of 
‘well-ordered’ peoples that could be either ‘liberal’ or ‘decent’. If one is to pursue a 
legitimate liberal international order it is consistent with tolerating ‘decent’ peoples. 
Decent peoples differ from liberal peoples in that they might have state religions and 
deny adherents of minority faiths to hold positions of power within the state and 
organize political participation via consultation hierarchies rather than competitive 
elections. However, a global society of liberal and decent peoples is possible, Rawls 
says, because liberal conceptions of justice with ideals and principles for international 
policy are possible for both a reasonably just, liberal people and decent, non-liberal 
peoples. This is realized through an ‘overlapping consensus’ of agreement on justice 
62 ‘Justice as Fairness’ is two principles of justice from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice 
63 The Liberty Principle is referred to earlier in the text. See paragraph 2.3.3. 
64 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p.6 
65 See the work of Charles Beitz for more on positive duties for the global justice and eradication of poverty. He argued for 
Rawls’ difference principles globally. Thomas Pogge and Henry Shue are also relevant for similar positions on global, 
distributive justice. 
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as fairness between societies with different religious and philosophical views or 
different conceptions of the good. The overlapping consensus is reached when 
transcending the conflicting religious, moral and philosophical views to arrive at a 
common understanding of an independent, political conception of justice and 
governance.  
2.5.2 Theories of impartiality 
The moral and political philosopher Brian Barry supports Rawls’ conception 
of justice as fairness saying that it is the best worked out exemplar of justice as 
impartiality.66 Barry’s theory on justice as impartiality is not dissimilar to Rawls’ 
overlapping consensus. Barry’s theory is made on the terms of a reasonable 
agreement which is based on premises which “reasonable people who seeks to reach 
free, uncoerced agreement with others, would accept.”67 It also entails some sense of 
equality, as all people are to contribute in an equal manner and have to be able to feel 
that they have done as well as they could reasonably hope to, Barry suggests, and 
sums up that; “the whole idea that we should seek agreement with everybody rests 
upon a fundamental commitment to the equality of all human beings.”68  Justice as 
impartiality calls for principles and rules that are capable of forming the basis of free 
agreement among people seeking agreement on reasonable terms. Being impartial 
means not being motivated by private considerations. Hence it follows in Barry’s 
reasoning that when we combine the principles of justice as impartiality and impartial 
behavior, we can assume that “any principles which can be impartially justified must 
of necessity be principles that mandate universal impartiality.”69 This is the 
fundamental premise behind the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a universal ideal. 
 
66 Barry, Brian: Justice as Impartiality, Preface 
67 Ibid. p.7 
68 Ibid. p.8 
69 Ibid. p.11 
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If impartial principles are accepted by all and is for everyone’s best in a liberal 
society, the same principles must be valid for non-liberal societies as well. We have 
already seen how Mill viewed democratic governments as providers of that kind of 
moral training that enables people to choose an impersonal rather than a self-
interested perspective on politics, which is quite consistent with the liberal ideal of 
impartiality.  
The moral philosopher Thomas Nagel does not fully agree with the Rawlsian 
account of liberal impartiality. Nagel criticizes liberals for being partial when it 
comes to the value of individual freedom, whereas they claim to be impartial when it 
comes to individual freedom and limitations of state interference. A liberal comes in 
conflict with his own ideal of impartiality and tolerance when theories on political 
legitimacy distinguish between the values a person can appeal to in conducting his 
own life and those he can appeal to in justifying the exercise of political power. 
Rawls’ overlapping consensus requires that one disregards ones own personal beliefs 
in religion, morality and philosophy in order to agree on a political conception of 
justice. Nagel means liberalism should provide the religious with a reason for 
tolerance.70 It is not sufficient to exclude knowledge of one’s religious beliefs from 
the original position on the ground that it is needed to make agreement possible. “The 
question is whether there is a viable form of impartiality that makes it possible to 
exclude such factors from the basis of one’s acceptance of political institutions, or 
whether, alternatively, we have to give up the hope of liberal legitimacy.”71 Liberal 
impartiality claims an authority that will not be universally accepted, Nagel argues, 
because it justifies the resistance of particular values in certain cases, and will not 
secure universal agreement.72 This is the problem with the Rawlsian conception of 
justice, because it does not offer any alternative, substantive moral ideas, it merely 
 
70 Nagel, Thomas: “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy,  1987, p.229 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. p.240 
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talks about what could be reasonably rejected. Nagel claims that this version of 
liberalism requires a special explanation by reference to more fundamental moral 
ideas. Otherwise it would be difficult to see what form impartiality should take in 
political theory, and especially in the liberal idea of universal implementation of 
liberal democratic institutions in authoritarian societies. We cannot impose our own 
conception of the good on others. We need to know what is good for other people in 
order to distribute and promote the good. On the other hand, we cannot give others’ 
interests and preferences more authority than our own, just because we accept the 
liberal ideal of impartiality. The liberal pursuit of the good is conceived for yourself 
and others within the limits of high-order impartiality. Nevertheless, this liberal 
conception of general impartiality seems to paradoxically claim greater authority than 
more special conceptions one believes to be true, Nagel objects.73 I agree with Nagel 
in that liberals have problems with defending a universal application of the ideal of 
impartiality and its way of legitimizing political authority, because it does in itself 
hold an authoritative value of impersonal judgment in the political sphere. When the 
value of impartiality is not accepted in non-liberal societies, it is a liberal paradox that 
this value is wrongly, in the terms of liberal universal ethics, imposed on others. I 
therefore find liberal impartiality to be a non-neutral principle which through 
liberalism in international relations gives priority to certain distinct values over 
others.  
The liberal paradox is more than in any other sphere of global politics, shown 
in the liberal communities in the West’s attempt to expand democracy to authoritarian 
contexts. Larbi Sadiki addresses this issue in his work on Arab democratic discourse. 
Even if democracy and Western values are not instantly welcomed in the Arab world,  
Sadiki still advertises for some kind of transfer of Western standards by stating that: 
“No credible view of or quest for democracy in the Arab world or anywhere else can 
be taken seriously without some normative standpoint.” 74 But Sadiki takes 
 
73 Ibid. p.228 
74 Sadiki, Larbi: The Search for Arab Democracy, p.54 
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precautions by specifying that a normative standpoint should not overlook, for 
instance, cultural specificity and the role of religion in many Arab countries. 
 Before discussing this any further, we will look at the legitimacy of 
democratization. 
2.6 Liberalism in non-liberal communities  
2.6.1 The rationale behind democracy promotion 
Since democratic societies always are marked by a diversity of irreconcilable 
doctrines of religion, philosophy and moral, tolerance is by Rawls lifted as a crucial, 
liberal value to promote cooperation and stability in a society. The theory of justice 
does not provide a comprehensive conception of the good, but is compatible with a 
liberal conception of the role of justice; that governments should be neutral between 
competing conceptions of the good. However, that does not entail an acceptance of 
all forms of governmental practices. States violating human rights or behaving in an 
externally aggressive manner are ‘outlaw’ states and do not have the right to mutual 
respect and toleration possessed by liberal and decent peoples.75 Rawls further asserts 
that violations of human rights can justify military interventions in the violating 
states, but hopes of course that such societies can be induced to reform peacefully by 
the good examples of liberal and decent peoples. In The Law of Peoples Rawls treats 
the possibility of transforming non-liberal societies into liberal societies. He is an 
advocate for the international legitimacy of democracy and a supporter of foreign 
democracy promotion. Rawls holds the ideal of the statesman as a political leader 
who looks to the next generation and promotes international harmony, even in the 
face of significant domestic pressure to do otherwise.76 Although, if this would be the 
 
75 Rawls, John: The Law of Peoples, Ideal theory, part 1 
76 Ibid. 
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norm for practicing the liberal ideal of impartiality in international affairs, it seems 
that external legitimacy is given a higher authority than internal. This is both 
unfortunate and undemocratic, because for democratic transition to be successful and 
for democracy to be consolidated, it is crucial that it is accepted by the people.  
2.6.2 External democratization forces 
Robert Dahl strongly emphasizes how democracy has to be wanted by the 
people, and so does Mill in his article “A Few words on Non-Intervention”77 where 
he says that a people cannot really be made free by outsiders, but must win freedom 
for themselves. This was the general belief up until the 1990s, before then 
democratization was seen as domestically driven and international efforts where seen 
as external supplements to national processes. When democracy started to spread to 
Latin America, and to some extent to Asia and Africa, the international dimension of 
democratization became on the agenda of political change. The importance of 
international presence and interactions between domestic politics and the 
international order is seen as important for shaping the politics of democratization.78 
Institutions, states, NGOs, transnational networks which are working for global 
governance have all developed different strategies and models to promote democracy. 
They have done this with mixed results and varying degrees of success, and there are 
numerous examples of projects of democracy promotion that have failed.  
It can be argued that the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a democratization 
project. In that case, it is a good example of a failed democratization project that has 
not succeeded in establishing a sustainable and survivable democracy, in spite of 
massive American political, military and financial efforts. Still, the prevailing view is 
that democracy promotion is a legitimate business because it advances liberal 
freedom and stable peace. With this view, comes the position that the leaders of one 
 
77 Mill, John S.: “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” in Foreign Policy Perspectives No.8, p.6 (first published in 1859) 
78 Grugel, Jean: Democratization and Development, p.116 
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society are able to dictate other societies on what it is that equals a good and just 
society. Michael Walzer criticizes this view and questions how we can say that one 
just society is better than another. “Certainly”, he says, “justice is better than tyranny, 
but whether one just society is better than another, I have no way of saying. Is there a 
particular understanding (and then a particular distribution) of social goods that is 
good simply?”79 According to the liberal stance, it is problematic to operate with one 
particular understanding of the good, as we have already seen in our earlier 
discussion. Yet promoting liberal democracy as the only understanding of a just 
society is doing exactly this. The liberal therefore faces a dilemma of being forced to 
make a stance against his own ideal of impartiality and value-neutrality.  
Walzer further claims that justice is relative to social meanings and that ‘just’ 
cannot require a radical redesign of a society opposed to the shared understandings of 
its members. Then justice itself would become tyrannical.80 Walzer relies on a 
broader conception of justice, which requires citizens to rule in one sphere and to be 
ruled in another. Externally imposed ideologies must meet internal standards of 
justice in order to be legitimate.  
Universal liberalism allows for state autonomy and people’s self-determination 
through the consolidation of democratic institutions. If the result of this self-
determination is that citizens do not want a liberal state, it may be incompatible with 
the liberal values of for instance freedom of expression. An elected government may 
prohibit negative expressions about one religion and in that sense choose to limit the 
freedom of expression. Can universal liberalism still allow for self-determination 
even if it means it has to accept that a society wants an Islamic state?  If it does not, 
liberalism would appear to be imperialist.  In the case of Turkey, the citizens voted 
for an Islamic state in the latest election, but the military oppressed the public opinion 
and aided the secular government to continue in office. 
 
79 Walzer, Michael: Spheres of Justice, p.312 
80 Ibid. p.313 
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It is important to separate between the debates over whether liberal principles 
apply to all political communities and is a cosmopolitan theory or if it is a state 
centered, communitarian theory. It is possible to argue for liberal values within one 
political community and not for a universal, cosmopolitan liberal political 
community. According to Rawls, liberal political principles are not justified for all 
societies and there can be ‘decent hierarchical societies’. The respect for human 
rights and a social cooperative structure, however, apply to all peoples. The debate 
between communitarians and cosmopolitans was not important within classical 
liberal theory, but in contemporary political liberalism it has become more relevant. 
Modern political theory stresses the importance of democracy promotion in order to 
achieve global peace and sustainable development. As I have mentioned earlier, 
adherents of global distributive justice argue for a global adaptation of Rawls’ 
difference principle to eradicate social inequalities in order to expand political 
liberalism worldwide. If liberal principles require equality, redistribution and self-
determination, it is crucially important whether these principles apply only within 
particular communities or whether their reach is global. Should liberal democracy 
only be applied to the West, where most are well off in already free and liberal 
societies, or should it be applied globally, where many live in severely un-free and 
illiberal societies? Democracy promoters have already taken a stand on this debate 
about the reach of the liberal political theory, and promote what they hold to be 
universal values. We will now look more into what actual values or standards the 
Western democracy promoters do export. 
2.6.3 The values exported by the West  
We have seen that liberal democracy is commonly described as a system that 
at the same time aims to limit the scope and reach of government over its citizens to 
preserve individual freedom, and have a popular sovereignty calling for majority rule 
through periodic elections.81 We recall that according to Larry Diamond, liberal 
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democracy is the only ‘real’ version of democracy. Diamond is inclined to dismiss 
minimalist definitions of democracy in merely electoral terms, and sees political and 
civil freedoms as necessary to ensure both electoral competition and a wider range of 
democratic functions. He claims that electoral democracies vary in degree of 
freedom82 and are so called ‘pseudo’ or ‘quasi’ democracies that fail to acknowledge 
political repression that marginalizes significant segments of the population. If India, 
with its violations of human rights in Kashmir is to be considered a democracy, there 
is something inconsistent with the term. The backdrop of the number of consolidated 
democracies after the third wave of democratization shows the shallowness of 
democratization and the difficulty with accepting electoral democracies as ‘real’ 
democracies. Diamond advocates for more consolidated, liberal democracies, not 
hollow pseudo-democracies. He criticizes Iran, Iraq, Algeria and Egypt for having 
electoral charades to disguise authoritarian despots because their elections are hollow 
and uncompetitive.  
The same is true for many other countries in the post-cold war period when 
democracy has the ideological hegemony, Diamond argues. They clearly do not 
fulfill the standards of what a real democracy is, which include free and fair electoral 
competition and no reserved domains of power for the military or other social and 
political parties where the officeholders are accountable to the electorate and to one 
another. Diamond explains the’ electoral charade’ with the growing recognition of 
free elections and that government’s feel compelled to hold elections in order to gain 
international legitimacy. These external demands for state legitimacy do not 
necessarily mean that elections ensure internal legitimacy.  
The British political scientist Jean Grugel has evaluated the efficiency of the 
policies among a wide range of pro-democracy agents, and she finds good reasons to 
be skeptical towards their impact.83  She claims that the major efforts that have been 
 
82 See Freedom House ranking electoral democracies rated as not-free, partly-free and free in “Freedom in the World 2008: 
Selected data from Freedom House’s annual global survey of political rights and civil liberties” 
83 Grugel, Jean: Democratization. A Critical Introduction, s.135 
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made and the numerous, costly democracy programs have had little positive effect. 
This is due to their failure in counting on “significant support across a range of 
internal elites and civil society actors (...)”.84 We cannot expect external forces of 
democratization to create enduring, stable and substantive changes in a society 
without supporting ongoing social pressure and mobilizing for democracy internally. 
No external support can provide this domestic pressure if it is absent, as seems to be 
the case in most Middle Eastern countries. What actually creates the most change is 
the new global political economy which is causing increasing interdependency 
between all parts of the world and which is, according to Grugel, responsible for “the 
prevalence of democracy as a discourse and an ideal because it is able to penetrate 
dependent societies and influence mentalities and aspirations.”85 The pressures 
generated by the global political economy account for the diffusion and the ideal that 
liberal democracy represents the only legitimate version of the ‘good society’ while 
globalization of the economy at the same time reproduces inequality and reduces 
developing countries’ autonomy. The power of defining democracy lies with the 
Western authorities, institutions and agents, not with the developing countries. All 
these factors combined, make a successful consolidation of democracy problematic, 
especially when the recipes for democracy building have little roots in the social 
reality to which they are applied. Grugel concludes that the result is “that the 
dominant project for democratization is simultaneously a project of 
Westernization.”86 That is precisely what foreign policy makers must avoid when 
designing strategies for democracy promotion.  
Oliver Schlumberger also points out that when assessing functioning 
democratic elements, donors have their own Western home countries in mind.87 
 
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid. p.139 
86 Ibid. 
87 Schlumberger, Oliver: ”Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts” in 
Dietrich Jung (ed.): Democratization and Development, p. 41 
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Many of the ideals of liberalism are adopted in Western societies and values that we 
hold, such as impartiality, tolerance, liberty, the pursuit of the good and the freedom 
of the individual. The beginning of any design of strategies for the promotion of good 
or democratic governance stands as a process of a ‘self-awareness raising’ by the 
donor community itself about what makes a ‘good’ democracy. This derives from 
democratic theory because it may tell us about individual elements of democratic 
regimes, but not how these elements work in a given social, economic, political or 
historical context.88  
Many deep-rooted dogmas of democracy, like secularism, capitalism, 
individualism and nationalism are challenged in the Middle Eastern context.89 This 
leaves democracy promoters with problems when designing and formulating 
strategies for democracy promotion, also because little is known about the relative 
importance of individual elements of democracy for the process of democratic 
transition. Schlumberger says that the democracy-agents must be aware of what 
political environment they are involved in and be careful with assuming that 
democratic reforms that have worked in the West are necessarily feasible in the 
Middle East. We need to increase the focus on the causes of the robustness of Arab 
authoritarianism and analyze the reasons why it so strongly resists the international 
pressure for democracy and the respect for human rights.  
 
 
88 Ibid. p.42 
89 Sadiki, Larbi: The Search for Arab Democracy”, p.53 
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3. The Position of Democracy in the Middle East  
3.1 Illiberalism in the Middle East  
In the introduction I asked what is the position of democracy in the Middle 
East? In this chapter I will address this question by looking at Arab scholarly 
literature and democratic discourse and theories on development and democratization. 
First I will give an account of the current state of democracy, freedom and 
development in the region, primarily based on the annual surveys of freedom in the 
world in 2007 and 2008 from Freedom House, the reports on human development 
from 2006 and 2007/2008 and Arab Human Development Reports from 2002 to 2005 
from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These reports, together with 
the scholarly literature, will shed light on trends of democracy in today’s Middle 
East, and a selection of explanations for the lack of democratic practice in the region 
will be presented. The chapter will end with a discussion about the challenges of the 
ideological transfer of liberal democratic values.  
3.1.1 The state of democracy and freedom in the Middle East 
The Middle East is one of the regions in the world where democracy has the 
weakest position. “No single Arab country can yet be classified as a democracy” 
Larbi Sadiki proclaims,90 and there has not been one peaceful transfer of power in an 
Arab country for decades.91 The region is said to be the part of the world where 
autocracies are most robust 92 and that it is the part of the world where democracy 
 
90 Sadiki, Larbi: The Search for Arab Democracy, p.13 
91 Schlumberger, Oliver: “Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Contexts” in 
Dietrich Jung (ed.): Democratization and Development, p.34 
92 Bellin, Eva: ”The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective” in 
Comparative Politics, 2004 
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faces its greatest challenge.93 Arab states make up the world’s most un-free region. In 
contrast to all other developing regions, the Middle East and North Africa have not 
liberalized politically over the past one and a half decades. Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which is considered to be the least developed part of the world with the largest part of 
the population living in extreme poverty, has had a greater expansion of democracy 
with a larger percentage of free countries than the Middle East.94 This is also true 
compared to Latin America, where the only authoritarian country is communist-ruled 
Cuba and the rest are considered free or partly free electoral democracies, according 
to Freedom House.95  
While the rest of the world has experienced a wave of democratization the last 
three decades the number of electoral democracies has nearly doubled since 1972,96 
the Middle East and North Africa have remained resistant to democratization. This 
region has in fact had a decline in electoral democracies, from three electoral 
democracies in 1972 to two in 2008.97 In 1972 Lebanon, Turkey and Israel were 
classified as electoral democracies, and the present year only the latter two are 
classified as such. Egypt, Syria and Tunisia are also registered as moving backwards 
with a major decline of freedom. 
According to the Freedom House survey for 2008, thirteen countries in Middle 
East and North Africa are designated as not free; seven as partly free and only one 
 
93 Wright, Robin: “Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation” in Journal of Democracy 7.2, 1996 
94See Freedom House: “Freedom in the World 2008 : Selected data from Freedom House’s annual global survey of political 
rights and civil liberties” and table in Oliver Schlumberger : “Dancing with Wolves: Dilemmas of Democracy Promotion in 
Authoritarian Contexts” in Dietrich Jung (ed.): Democratization and Development, p.35 
95 See Freedom House: “Freedom in the World 2008: Selected data from Freedom House’s annual global survey of political 
rights and civil liberties” for regional comparisons.  
96 Bellin, Eva: ”The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective” in 
Comparative Politics, 2004, p.139 
97 See Freedom House: “Freedom in the World 2008: Selected data from Freedom House’s annual global  survey of 
political rights and civil liberties” 
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country as a free, liberal democracy.98 The free country is Israel, with the exceptions 
of the Israeli-occupied territories on the West Bank, Gaza Strip, The Golan Heights 
and East Jerusalem, as well as the Palestinian Authority-administered territories. 
Inhabitants of these occupied territories have limited political rights and civil 
liberties, and the Palestinian authorities are therefore classified as not free, 
authoritarian regimes.99 Another regional example which further decreases the status 
of democracy in the Middle East is Morocco and the case of the occupied Western 
Sahara, also called ‘Africa’s last colony’.100 The disputed territory of Western Sahara 
was never decolonized as it went from Spanish rule to Moroccan occupation in 1976, 
and has been denied independence ever since, despite numerous UN-resolutions 
about the Sahrawians’ right to a referendum and autonomy. Democracy is in a poor 
state in the Middle East and the lack of respect for human rights is dominant in 
several Arab states. That does not necessarily mean that the Middle East is less 
developed than other regions. 
3.2 Democracy and development 
I will now look at the relationship between the level of democracy and the 
level of development. A certain level of development and economic growth can be 
seen as a precondition for successful democratic consolidation. Wealthy countries are 
generally more democratic than less wealthy countries, but that does not mean that 
there is an inevitably positive relationship between wealth and democracy. The 
United Nations’ Human Development Report of 2007/2008 reveals a positive trend in 
human and economic development for most of the Middle Eastern countries. UNDP 
publishes annually a human development index (HDI). The HDI provides a measure 
 
98 Ibid. The grouping of countries is here done by me, according to the definition of Middle East given in paragraph 2.2.3 
and Freedom House’s list of the level of freedom in independent countries. 
99 Ibid.  
100 See for instance Pascale Harter: “Africa’s last colony”,  2003 
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of three dimensions of human development; 1) The ability to live a long and healthy 
life (measured by life expectancy), 2) Being educated (measured by adult literacy and 
enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels) and 3) Having a decent 
standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity and income).101 The HDI is 
not meant to give a comprehensive measure of human development, and it does not 
include important indicators such as respect for human rights, democracy and 
equality. It aims to provide one perspective on human progress and on the complex 
relationship between income and well-being with the basic objective that 
development is “to create an enabling environment in which people can enjoy long, 
healthy and creative lives”.102  
More than half of the Middle Eastern countries have a medium level of human 
development in a global study where all the countries in the world are rated according 
to their HDI. Less than half of the countries, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Israel, 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are measured as having 
high human development and are ranked among the 60 most developed countries in 
the world.103 In 2006 only five countries had a high ranking according to the HDI and 
Yemen had among the lowest ranking on the HDI globally. This clearly shows a 
major advancement in human development for the Middle East, as several Arab 
countries are higher on the list than two years before and no Arab country is ranked 
as having a low human development.104 
Criticism can of course be made of the statistical methods employed both by 
the Freedom House and UNDP. On the one hand, Freedom House obviously adapts a 
Western measurement of what democracy entails and accepts only liberal 
democracies as free countries. The countries classified as electoral democracies can, 
 
101 UNDP: “The State of Human Development” in Human Development Report 2006, p. 263. 
102 Mahbub Ul Haq quoted in ibid. 
103 UNDP: “The Human Development Index” from Human Development Report 2007/2008 
104 Yemen was ranked as having low human development in 2006 and this year it was in medium development, and only 
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according to the survey, turn out to be what Diamond calls ‘electoral charades’ as 
Freedom House does not measure the actual outcome of the alleged democratic 
institutions, only their presence. Individual rights and liberties ought to be the main 
indicators for measuring democracy in a country, not just the existence of a 
democratic framework. On the other hand, UNDP can be criticized for putting too 
much emphasis on economic conditions such as economic growth and income per 
capita. These are solely quantitative indicators for development which fails to give 
the whole picture of human development which could have been given with more 
qualitative measures of for instance having a decent life. However, I do find Freedom 
House and UNDP’s global rankings of countries’ level of freedom and development 
as useful tools for comparative purposes and in the search for global trends. 
3.2.1 Development as freedom 
When observing that Arab countries annually climb higher on the human 
development ranking, it is a puzzle that freedom is in decline and the democratic 
rights for people in the region are not increasing in a similar manner. “Development 
can be seen (…) as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy”,105  
economist Amartya Sen says in his book Development as Freedom, where he 
explores the relationship between freedom as a basic constituent of and an enabler for 
development. Individual income and purchasing power parity can be important means 
to expand freedoms and achieve development. Yet human welfare is not to be 
equated with material wealth, and the factors determining the human quality of life 
are numerous, not singularly dependent on economic growth and stability. Quality of 
life, therefore, is what ought to measure human development and progress.  
 The Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR) from 2002 to 2005 show 
significant progress in many areas of human development the last three decades, but 
find the shortcomings of the Arab institutional structure as obstacles for further 
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building of human development. The areas of human development where the Arab 
states fall short are in knowledge acquisition, good governance, freedom and the 
empowerment of women. The first UN report suggest three goals the Arab states 
should strive for in order to reconstitute their societies: 1. Prioritize knowledge 
acquisition and deployment of human capabilities with the aim of maximizing human 
wellbeing in the region, 2. Absolute respect for human rights and freedoms to build 
the good governance needed for the realization of human development and 3. 
Empower Arab women and enable development of human capabilities that will give 
girls and women the same possibilities as their male counterparts.106 
The second AHDP report addresses the same challenges as the first report, but 
focuses in particular on the challenges in the academic field of the capacity to 
produce knowledge. 107 According to this report, the Arab knowledge enterprise has 
yet to become independent from Western academia. The absence of institutional 
support for academic research in Arab states causes significant brain drain to the 
West. This is not conducive to the process of democratization. The second UN report 
concludes that the Arab culture has the capacity to become a knowledge society of 
the third millennium, but there are too many political hindrances entrenched in the 
social and economical structure that prevents knowledge acquisition. School systems 
and education under authoritarian rule rarely encourage the development of 
individual talents or facilitation of independent, critical research. An Arab league 
report from 2001 similarly calls for putting an end to the Arab brain drain, and 
stresses how large economic and human losses Arab states suffer due to the migration 
of Arab intellectuals to Western countries.108 The UN report recommends that the 
Middle East and North Africa prioritize the human capital it has which could form a 
strong infrastructure for a knowledge renaissance. Educational reforms are crucial in 
 
106 UNDP: “Creating Opportunities for Future Generations”, Arab Human Development Report 2002 
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the process of development and democratization. Schooling will inform the public 
and make them aware of their rights and possibilities of demanding political reforms 
as a free electorate. 
3.2.2 Freedom and good governance 
 The aspect of freedom is especially challenging in the Arab world, the UN 
reports finds, with all the international unfavorable political developments to the 
Middle East. The War on Terror and the occupations of Palestine and Iraq contribute 
to destabilizing the region and undermine the progress of democratization by 
stereotyping the Arab region as a ‘breeding grounds for terrorism’. What the region 
needs is not war or a constant international hunt for terrorists, but a fundamental 
reinforcement of freedom and the promotion and expansion of good governance.  
The third AHDP report from 2004 is called “Towards Freedom in the Arab 
World” and concludes that the Arab world finds itself at a historical crossroads 
caught between oppression at home and violations from abroad. Arabs are 
increasingly excluded from determining their own future109 because they are deprived 
their basic freedoms. For freedom to be guaranteed, it requires a system of good 
governance resting on effective, popular representation and accountability to the 
people upheld by the rule of law and an independent judiciary applying the law 
impartially.110 The third AHDP report describes present day Arab societies as 
fundamentally in contrast with free societies, and says that to achieve human 
development in the Arab world it is required that the Arab countries transform into 
their opposites.111 This is quite a radical stance from UNDP, and seems unfeasible 
within the political culture of Arab societies. It therefore loses its value as a 
meaningful policy suggestion. Persisting tendencies in Arab social structures could 
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well lead to social, economic and political crises, the report predicts, and paints a 
depressive picture of the future prospects for freedom in the Middle East and North 
Africa.  
3.2.3 Women’s rights in Arab countries  
The last and most recent report on Arab Human Development analyzes the 
situation of women in the Arab world and finds some positive trends. There has been 
an increase in the level of education among women and in female political 
representation, and a decrease in discrimination under labor, family and marriage 
laws. The reports also state that the civil society’s struggle for freedom in Arab 
countries has intensified and that women’s empowerment has deep, historical roots in 
the region, and is not merely a Western import to the Arab world. Nevertheless, Arab 
women are still denied the right to vote in both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates, and are underrepresented in parliaments in Arab states. Despite higher 
female enrollment rates in university education, women do not enjoy equality with 
men when it comes to job opportunities. The obstacles women encounter outside 
family life derives from laws hindering women’s freedom of action and movement, a 
highly male-dominated culture, high fertility rates and wage discrimination between 
sexes. When women in some Arab countries are not allowed to drive or travel, it 
obviously restricts their possibilities of self-realization and job acquisition. 
The analysis in AHDR 2005 ends by stating that the basic principle of Islam is 
equality amongst humans and between men and women in particular. Arab and 
Muslim feminist movements fight to combat the jurisprudential interpretations of 
Islam that have contributed to the entrenchment of a lower status for women in some 
Islamic societies. Arab women are not free to reach their full potential and as long as 
they are deprived their liberty, the Arab societies cannot meet the UN goals of 
prioritizing education, respect human rights and empower women. The economical 
and social conditions are seen as hindrances for Arab women’s strive for increased 
freedom, and reinforce female exclusion from political participation. If development 
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in the Middle East shall happen according to Amartya Sen’s use of the term, it must 
expand the real freedoms people enjoy. A sole economic and social development in 
the region will not ensure real human development without being accompanied by 
political reforms and progress. 
3.2.4 Democratic development? 
Political renewal in the Arab Middle East and Iran will be incomplete without 
the inputs of women and their understandings of democracy, Larbi Sadiki declares.112 
No democracy can be established in a society where not all citizens are considered 
equal before the law, women and religious minorities included. The liberation of 
women will be realized in the Arab society by eliminating all that impairs the human 
dignity of women and enable them equal treatment with men. That means 
emancipating women from all diminishing factors such as ignorance, disease and fear 
as well as granting women the complete enjoyment of political rights. That entails 
first to give substance to the cosmetic reforms that hide repression of freedom 
through uninterrupted violation of human rights.113 These reforms are prevalent in the 
Arab political climate and simply staged to please the international environment that 
presses for democracy promotion.114 Most scholars tend to agree that changes in 
formal, democratic institutions without content do not necessarily have anything to 
do with real democratization. “Current political Arab change is not a matter of 
democratization, but is more adequately interpreted as “a re-equilibration and 
adjustment of authoritarian rule to change internal and external conditions.”115 The 
more complex question of whether these changes can be turned toward 
democratization by external actors remains open. What is certain is that the region 
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Contexts” in Dietrich Jung (ed.): Democratization and Development, p.33 
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enjoys a lot of international attention and an increased pressure to democratize, at 
least formally. The strong international pressure for formal democratic institutions 
might be a contributing factor to the political liberalization only initiated by the 
incumbent regimes’ as a survival strategy to maintain power.116 As I have said 
before, no peaceful transfer of power has taken place in any Arab country for 
decades, except intergenerational, so Arab political leaders’ fear of loosing power or
even their life, has root in reality. Arab leaders are not likely to risk giving awa
power voluntarily in a democratic election with an uncertain outcome. That cou
tantamount to commit political suicide. 
3.3 Central explanations for the state of democracy in the 
Middle East  
 The regime types we find in the Middle East have few Western counterparts 
and range from authoritarian republics, absolute monarchies, constitutional 
monarchies and one Islamic republic. It would be misleading to call any of the more 
liberal Arab countries either ‘democracies’ or ‘semi-authoritarian’, both from a 
quantitative and qualitative methodological view, Schlumberger suggests. According 
to him, all Arab regimes today fulfill the criteria of authoritarianism.117 A brief look 
at history shows that the democratic situation in the region has never been 
substantively different; all democratic experiments have failed. Does the Middle East 
lack the preconditions for democracy? 
Many causes for the failed attempts to consolidate democracy in the Middle 
East are deeply rooted in historical, cultural, social, religious, economic and political 
factors that are complexly interwoven with one another. A common approach to the 
study of Arab exceptionalism with regard to democratization starts with the notion of 
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prerequisites for democratic consolidation. The lack of a strong civil society, an 
economy controlled by the state, the inadequate income and literacy level in general, 
few democratic neighbors118 and a weak democratic culture are all possible 
explanations of the region’s failure to democratize. These are by no means exhaustive 
explanations of the problem of democracy in the Middle East, because it is a very 
complex and comprehensive theme, and an amplified explanation falls outside of the 
scope of this paper. I will focus on selected explanations emphasizing economic, 
historical and religious conditions. 
3.3.1 Economic conditions preventing democratic rights 
One can point at the state owned economy as undermining the capacity to 
build autonomous counterweight to the state, because the public sector accounts for a 
major share of employment and GDP generation in most countries.119 The social 
scientist S.M. Lipset’s studies revealed a positive relationship between democracy 
and various indicators of economic development. He found that democracy is related 
to the level of economic development and hypothesized that the more a well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.120 He found that the 
general income level of a nation affects its receptivity to democratic norms. Lipset 
argued that it is easier to accept the idea that it does not matter greatly which side is 
in power and if some redistribution is in place, as long as there is enough economic 
wealth in a country.121 This argument could be used both ways, saying that as long as 
one is economically secure, who governs is not that important, and one could 
therefore be inclined to accept authoritarian rule, as is the case in the Gulf States. The 
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120 Lipset, Seymor Martin: Political Man; The Social Bases of Politics, p.31 
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monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula are among the wealthiest countries in the world 
holding 2/3 of the world’s known oil reserves and about 40 % of the natural gas.122 
The power relations between state and society become increasingly unbalanced when 
the state controls the industry, the means of production and the economy. The state 
becomes economically independent of its citizens. The oil-rich Gulf States have 
generous welfare systems providing their citizens a ‘replacement’ for political 
influence which consequentially give them fewer incentives to criticize their 
regimes.123 When the rulers do not demand taxes, the citizen’s do not demand 
democracy.  
Political scientists still debate conditions for successful democratization and 
the relationship between economic development and democratic consolidation.124 We 
have already seen from UNDP Arab Human Development Reports that many Arab 
countries do progress in economic development and in literacy. Social and economic 
inequalities are still dominant, and so is the discrimination of women. Other 
explanations for the lack of democratic practice in the region could be found in the 
history of political development.  
3.3.2 Rule of law as a precondition for freedom 
In the previous chapter we read that classical liberalism advocates the 
limitation of legal restraints so that individuals have the maximum possible amount of 
freedom to enjoy life as best they can. Classical liberalists do not oppose law itself, 
but hold a negative conception of freedom and perceive governmental interference as 
an obstacle to freedom. In the liberal view, every individual has the freedom to 
pursue one’s interest to the extent that it does not deprive others of their liberty to do 
 
122 Selvik, Kjetil: “Demokratiproblemet i Midtøsten” in NUPI report  Hvor hender det?, 2007, p. 4 and for a list of the 
world’s proved oil reserves by geographic region and how much the Middle East holds, see  International Energy Outlook 
2007, figure 39 
123 Selvik, Kjetil: “Demokratiproblemet i Midtøsten” in NUPI report 21 Hvor hender det?, 2007, p. 4 
124 See Inglehart, Ronald:  “Changing Values, Economic Development and Political Change” in International Social 
Science Journal, 1999 
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the same. Yet, European liberalism based on classical philosophy and enlightenment 
with a focus on individual rights and freedom, does not necessarily have to entail 
electoral democracy, Homa Katouzian writes in his book about Iranian history and 
the dialectic of state and society.125 He suggests that European states have always 
been based on the rule of law, even if they were absolutist and despotic authoritarian 
regimes. The revolutions in Europe have therefore been about replacing the existing 
law and expanding the rights and liberties of the citizens. Many Arab countries have 
had a history of arbitrary rule without a foundation in law, and there has been 
continuity in the arbitrary change of power. According to Katouzian, what 
distinguishes the West from the East is one basic fact; Societies in the West have 
always based themselves on law and justice, while in the East there has been a 
constant struggle for power and a “recurring circle of arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary 
rule.”126 The Iranian revolutions have both been revolts against the arbitrary rule, and 
a fight for normality and stability. The first revolution in the beginning of the 20th 
century was therefore about demanding law and justice, and this was granted by 
establishing a constitution based on democratic principles. A rule of law was by the 
reformists viewed as giving enhanced freedom. The Iranian reformists in the 
twentieth century advocated the importance of law, because to them, the law entails 
the concept of freedom itself.  Freedom without a legal framework was not perceived 
as possible. People were tired of having arbitrary freedom, and struggled to obtain 
stable, political freedom established by the rule of law.127  
The conception of a good society which I suggested in the introductory 
chapter, and my definition of democracy used in chapter 2, also relies on the rule of 
law, and on a human rights based approach to citizens’ freedom.  What is the relation 
 
125 Katouzian argues that European liberals like Adam Smith, David Hume, and John Locke did not enthusiastically 
advocate for representative government, nor popular democracy or even universal equality before the law. Their ideas did 
not go much further than the individual liberties of conscience, expression and the economic policy of laissez faire, 
Katouzian claims. The ideal of democratic government were first pursued by the American and French revolutions, 
Katouzian writes in Iranian History and Politics. The dialectic of state and society, p. 82 
126 Ibid. p. 25 
127 Ibid. p.89 
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between the claim that the rule of law is a precondition for democracy, and the view 
of the Iranian reformists on the rule of law as a precondition for freedom? Is the rule 
of law more fundamental in establishing a free society than democracy? The 
foundation for freedom then becomes rule of law, not democracy.  
To be sure, the rule of law has been perceived as an inseparable part of 
democracy, and it is difficult to imagine the development of a democratic society 
without the rule of law.128 The democratic institutions such as multi-party systems, 
competitive elections and a free press are embedded in the establishment of the rule 
of law. Without the rule of law, citizens would have no guarantee for the protection 
of their civil rights and liberties such as the freedom of expression and the right to 
freely participate in the politics of your country. What it is that can guarantee the 
continuation of the rule of law, is more uncertain, because the majority of the 
electorate can, within the constitutional restrains, choose to undermine the supremacy 
of legal norms and codes enforced by an independent judiciary. The electorate may 
also produce laws that deprives minorities or underrepresented groups their rights, 
and weaken the autonomy of the judiciary. Democratic institutions may be said to 
have been implemented to protect people’s rights through the rule of law, not in order 
to promote mass sovereignty or representative governments.129 European autocracies 
that were able to establish and maintain the rule of law, as Katouzian points out, were 
constrained by the powerful aristocratic elites, the church and different societal 
classes. These classes saw it in their interest to protect their rights and privileges 
through the law, especially with regard to property rights. In the case of early 20th 
century Iran, societal class structures of this kind were not present. The need for the 
 
128 See Sayyed Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh’s strong defense for the implementation of law quoted from Al-Jamal 
newspaper in 1905 in Homa Katouzian: Iranian History and Politics. The Dialectics of State and Society, p.85. Minxin Pei: 
”Economic Institutions, Democracy and Development”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999, pp.4  on the 
relation between the rule of law and political regimes and Larbi Sadiki: The Search for Arab Democracy, p. 224-5 on the 
importance of the rule of law for checks and balances and attain justice and liberty.  
129 Pei, Minxin: ”Economic Institutions, Democracy and Development”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1999,  pp.4 
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establishment of the rule of law was founded on the aspiration to be free from 
arbitrary rule.  
3.3.3 Contrasting conceptions of freedom 
The Iranian reformists had a positive conception of freedom and regarded the 
law as an enabler of political development and freedom. This is in contrast with the 
modern, liberal conception of freedom as absence of legal constraints or state 
interference in the life of the individual. The Iranian reformists wanted a radical 
transformation of a society completely unfamiliar with the rule of law. However, the 
Western democratic experiment came too early and the Iranian society was not ready.  
The revolution managed to contribute to modernization and secularization, but when 
it suppressed religious movements and was skeptical to Islam, the Islamist opposition 
turned against the regime. The support for Islamism today dominates the political 
opposition in the region, and represents for many the strongest political alternative to 
incumbent governments.130 Exceptions are Iran and Saudi Arabia, were Islamists in 
fact are in power positions.  
The strong religious convictions and the resistance towards secularization 
might be a contributing factor to the current state of democracy in the region. A 
prominent Shi’ite scholar, Muhammad Husayn Fadl-Allah131observes that “when it 
comes to democracy and dictatorship, the latter is much worse; when it is a question 
of democracy and Islam, Islam is the only choice.” He rejects democracy on the basis 
of popular sovereignty and argues that the democratic method does not yield 
legitimacy. According to Fadl-Allah, legitimacy derives from the Islamic framework 
and not from popular elections, and the imam is the only one who can permit freedom 
to criticize the government. In a non-Muslim pluralist society, Islamists should 
 
130 Selvik, Kjetil: “Demokratiproblemet i Midtøsten” in NUPI report 21 Hvor hender det?, 2007, p. 3 and Alan Richards: 
“Democracy in the Arab Regions: Getting There from Here”, Middle East Policy, Vol. XII, No.2, 2005 
131 Fadl-Allah quoted in Larbi Sadiki: The Search for Arab Democracy, p.242  
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support freedom regardless of its negative aspects, Fadl-Allah says.132 The 
understanding of freedom for an Islamist is not the definition of freedom as being 
exempted from external control and interference for the individual. In the Arab 
nationalist conception, freedom is collectively defined, for the nation as a whole.133 
That is why freedom defined in individualistic terms becomes negative for Fadl-
Allah. To Muslims, the liberal understanding of negative freedom does not entail real 
freedom, because that must be defined in religious terms.  
3.3.4 Islamic reform to accept democracy 
The Islamists’ views on freedom, liberties and laws are not necessarily 
incompatible with all liberal values, supporters for Islamic reforms suggest.134 The 
relationship between state power and religion might be more problematic, as the 
Islamists do not wish to separate as strongly between political and religious 
authorities as is practice in liberal democracies. The non-reformist Fadl-Allah is open 
to the possibility for Islamists to win government through the democratic method and 
adopt a few democratic elements, but he does not recognize the legitimacy of 
democracy. To him, Islam has the highest authority and it shall be realized through 
the state. This view is contrary to the liberal justification for separation between the 
state’s domain and the religious sphere. Liberal thinkers do not believe that one 
conception of the good can claim universal validity, and thus operate with a pluralist 
conception of good within a pluralistic society. A state ruled by one conception of the 
good or by one religion cannot accommodate the diversity of values among its 
citizens. Rawls is a good example of a liberal thinker that does not recognize an 
Islamic doctrine to be consistent with a pluralist conception of the good. A legitimate 
political authority in a pluralist society has to accept religious and philosophical 
 
132 Sadiki, Larbi: The Search for Arab Democracy, p.242 
133 Rubin, Barry: The Long War for Freedom, p.40 
134 See for instance Abdul Karim Soroush and Rachid al-Ghannouchi in Wright, Robin: “Islam and Liberal Democracy: 
Two visions of Reformation” in Journal of Democracy 7.2, 1996 
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pluralism and seek an overlapping consensus based on reasonable ideas. According to 
liberal ideals, an Islamic state recognizing only Islam as religion and its conception of 
a good society can therefore not be a legitimate, political authority. If a state is build 
on fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of belief, it will be 
pluralist.  
According to Muslim reformists, Islam preaches equality, justice and human 
dignity and has traditions of itjihad (interpretation), ijima (consensus) and shura 
(consultation), which are central in a democracy. Neither does Islam lack a tenet of 
pluralism, hence Islam does not have to be a major obstacle to democratization, claim 
several Islamists and Muslim intellectuals who support democracy, among others the 
Iranian philosopher Abdul Karim Soroush. Islam is often presumed to be inhospitable 
to democracy,135 but Soroush claims that there is no contradiction between Islam and 
the freedom inherent in a democracy. Islam and democracy have in fact an inevitable 
association. In a Muslim society one without the other is not complete. Following his 
line of arguing, to be a true Muslim, one must be free. And a true believer is one who 
has freely submitted to his faith, and can freely choose to leave his faith. To Soroush, 
this freedom is the basis of democracy. Soroush further holds that for an Islamic 
democracy to be legitimate, it must be chosen by a majority including both believers 
and non-believers. This is a theologically reformed way of justifying the 
implementation of democracy. In Soroush’ teachings the relation between state 
power, the mosque and religious jurisprudence is being redefined. By downgrading 
the role of the religious leaders he creates a space for democracy to unfold.  He 
argues against rigid thinking and elitism, and for secularization and a separation of 
religion from the state. This is a particularly sensitive topic in the Iranian context, 
where the Shi’ite Islam stresses the doctrinal and interpretative authority of Imams. 
Soroush is a believing Muslim and gives reinterpretations of the Quran and the 
 
135 Bellin, Eva: ”The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective” in 
Comparative Politics, 2004, p.8 
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Shari’a, and provides a foundation for a pluralist and tolerant society.136 The 
implementation of his teachings would signify a major modernization and 
accommodation of the classical interpretations of Islam and the role of religion and 
society.  
3.4 The resistance to Western democracy promotion 
In this chapter I have already stated several assumptions about the poor 
democratic practice in the Middle East, despite Western democracy promoters’ 
attempts at building democracies in the region. The fact remains that the Arab states 
have for centuries resisted the international pressure for democracy and continued 
their authoritarian, hierarchical, patron-client, family dynasty dominated political 
rule.137  
Central historical explanations of the problem of democracy in the Middle East 
point at the colonial past and how the European occupation contributed to hostility 
towards the West and the influence of the great powers. The founding of the state of 
Israel was from an Arab point of view regarded as the worst form of imperialism,138 
and many hold that a solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict is the key to democracy and 
stability in the Middle East. Israel’s close ties with the West and the actions of the 
state of Israel have certainly built up contempt against Western ideals and shaped the 
Arab states’ perception of democracy. Many Arabs feel threatened of what they see 
as a cultural imperialist project of Westernization and the changes that are brought 
upon them. Anti-Americanism is currently very dominant in the Middle East, and US 
policy is seen as a tool for both Zionism and imperialism. The Saudi writer Khaled al- 
Suleiman wrote that the real US goal is to destroy the moral bonds of the Arabs’ 
 
136 Wright, Robin: “Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two visions of Reformation” in Journal of Democracy 7.2, 1996, p.6 
137 Kassem, May: Egyptian Politics. The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule 
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social behavior. Al-Suleiman depicts a scenario where the Arabs would become a 
society just like the US where sexual relations with minors is permitted and where 
drinking alcohol is like drinking water and smoking marijuana like inhaling air.139 
Extremist, religious education strengthens the perceptions of the West as 
‘evil’, hegemonic and immoral. Increased knowledge and education about the West 
and its democratic ideals may contribute to a greater understanding of Western 
policies and intentions. There are indicators that Islam is under reforms of 
reinterpretation and modernization, and an increasing amount of reformers are now 
expressing their views publicly. However, reforms take time and the Islamic 
reformers are still a distinct minority. Authoritarianism and fundamentalism remain 
strong in the Middle East. The future prospects for political change are difficult to 
determine.  
 
 
 
 
139 Al- Suleiman quoted in Rubin, Barry: The long war for Freedom, p.132.  
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4. Future Prospects for Change      
4.1 Political change in the region 
The previous chapters have examined the liberal theoretical foundations for 
democracy and for the ideal of exporting liberal democracies. I have also looked at 
the state of democracy in the Middle East and discussed some of the contextual 
challenges of adapting to the specific liberal democratic values. Authoritarian 
regimes are traditionally not particularly prone to change and it lays in the nature of 
the system that stability and preserving the status quo is an important goal. However, 
the increasing pressure generated from the globalization of world politics and the 
strong international diplomatic advocacy for democracy and human rights does have 
an impact on the ability of survival for autocratic regimes. Thus far in the thesis, I 
have pointed at the weakness of the alleged democratic reforms certain authoritarian 
regimes have made in order to adjust to international pressure for norms of state’s 
domestic conduct. I have called the democratic reforms ‘cosmetic’ and that they are 
nothing but ‘electoral charades’,140 and I have accused the Western democracy 
promoters of putting too much emphasis on elections and not on the importance of 
internal legitimacy. I have made these accusations because I believe foreign policy 
makers’ exaggerate the democratic effect of premature elections in newly established 
democracies.  
This chapter will look at what I believe has a larger effect on democracy, 
within the context of the Middle East and North Africa, and focus on prospects for 
change in the future. There are various perspectives to take when studying democracy 
and democratization. Some scholars study institutional structures, such as 
independent judiciary, a functioning parliament and human rights laws. Others study 
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the role of the civil society and its function in stimulating the demand for democracy 
and freedom. I have chosen to study the fundamental principles of democracy such as 
freedom, legitimacy, equality, participation and the rule of law. In the following, I 
will focus on participation and freedom of speech. 
4.1.1 Prospects for Arab electoral democracy 
In many circumstances, elections do not create long lasting changes, nor do 
they contribute to the successful consolidation of democracy. Popular sovereignty 
means nothing if people do not have the opportunity to utilize the power vested upon 
them by freely participating in a competitive election. Freedom of speech, opinion, 
association and demonstration is vital in ensuring democratic practice. Public debate 
becomes meaningless if people do not have the freedom to openly debate political 
issues. Oppositional parties must be allowed to compete for the votes in a real, 
competitive election.  Unless these freedoms and rights are established, elections risk 
becoming mere charades performed by the incumbent political leaders in order to 
claim they are democratizing the country and of course, to look good to the 
international society. Elections must be more than an illustration for the exterior, but 
ought to be a reflection of the domestic situation and the voters’ preferences.141  
In the last few years there has been a growth in free elections and an estimate 
for 2008 is that we will have 121 free elections globally in the world’s electoral 
democracies. That is a clear increase from the 110 free elections we had four years 
earlier.142 However, only 90 countries are predicted by Freedom House as free in 
2008, despite the much higher number of free elections.143 The Middle Eastern 
countries have had a dramatic rise in national elections and an expansion of suffrage 
 
141 See Dyer, Gwynne: “New democracies”, 2004 
142 Ibid. 
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the last decade. The increase in electoral processes may prove crucial to the spread of 
democracy and is central in the debate about the expansion of political participation 
in the Middle East. Few elections have open outcomes, however, and the incumbent 
elites manage to structure the electoral systems in order to influence the election 
outcome. Restrictions on press freedoms and the governmental monopoly over the 
media also play a role in influencing electoral outcomes. The existence of regular 
elections should therefore be discarded as an indication of political liberalization or 
democratic transition, the political scientist Maye Kassem holds. One should instead 
not merely focus on the outcome of the elections, but also on what produced such an 
outcome.144 In Egypt, the multi-party election is staged in order to reinforce 
authoritarian rule, not to change the political leadership.145The president has an 
‘unchecked’ and ‘unbalanced’ power, and is the leader of the police and the military. 
His police closely supervise the elections and the counting of votes, and make sure 
the president does not get any surprises.146   
4.1.2  Prospects for Arab freedom of speech 
Egypt has resisted the international pressure for democracy for decades and has 
been able to protect its own, personal authoritarian rule. The Emergency Law 
efficiently limits the freedom of speech, even if the constitution says otherwise. At a 
meeting in Cairo February 12th this year, information ministers from 22 Arab nations 
signed an agreement about limiting the freedom of speech. Only Qatar, the country 
housing the main office of the pan-Arab TV-channel Al-Jazeera and Lebanon refused 
to implement these new rules.  The meeting was arranged by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  
The agreement signed by the ministers, authorizes the governments to suspend 
the permission for channels that have “offended Arab leaders, national or religious 
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symbols” 147 and put restrictions on TV-channels and prohibits ‘insults’ to the 
government. The justification is that the media shall not jeopardize social harmony, 
national unity, public order or traditional values. The document states that the media 
shall respect human dignity in all their programs, and they shall respect the 
individual’s right to privacy and not nurture any hatred or discrimination. Neither 
should the channels transfer anything that provoke violence or terrorism, or show any 
material that could encourage smoking or drinking of alcohol.148  
Siham Faraj, president of an Arab human rights organization attacks the new 
law on the account that freedom should be the criteria to measure human 
advancement. He says the law about limiting the freedom of speech is meaningless 
because it is vague and imprecise.149 Who decides what is offending to national or 
religious symbols? And what if the criticism of political leaders is true? Authoritarian 
regimes are not particularly tolerant when it comes to criticism. Journalists who say 
or write some thing unpopular, or contrary to the state’s official policies, risk being 
arrested. What does this say about the respect for freedom of speech in the future of 
the Middle East? The respect for the freedom of speech is very high in the Western 
democracies, and this freedom is of significantly important in a democracy. If people 
are not able to express their opinions freely, having a free, competitive election with a 
fully informed electorate becomes difficult to perform. Arab governments seem to 
tighten their control over their populations and halt the Arab reforms for democracy 
and human rights. This is a major obstacle for the future democratic prospects for the 
region.  
 
147 Ali, Ahmed: “Internasjonale Rapporter: Frykter for ytringsfriheten” in Ny Tid, No 11, 14-20 March 2008 , p.29 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
  
 
67
                                             
4.2  Political reforms and the role of US 
The political reforms in the Middle East move both in an increasingly 
moderate, and reform-friendly direction, and in a more radical, religiously extremist 
direction. Current trends and policy suggestions from academic scholars specializing 
in the field show that the region’s political development varies from country to 
country and that both moderate and radical movements gain support. In an article 
about the prospects for Muslim democracy, Muqtedar Khan analyzes the role of US 
policy in the Middle East. Khan says that democratization is the US policy choice to 
meet the challenge of anti-Americanism and the radicalization of Muslims; especially 
in the Middle East. The US’ foreign policy makers hold that only democracy can 
weaken the conditions that stimulate political radicalism in the Muslim world. Khan 
says that according to this view, a quick transition from authoritarianism to more 
open societies will improve economic opportunities and foster responsible politics by 
making governments accountable and giving people a sense of participation. 
Comparative analyzes of democratization likewise conclude that if economic systems 
are transformed into market economies, the social basis of democracy will be 
strengthened,150 and that promoting democracy can be a means of economic 
development.151 
4.2.1 Who wants democracy in the Middle East? 
The Bush administration operates by the view that democracy is both 
necessary and feasible in the Middle East.152 The US’ commitment to democracy and 
freedom in the Middle East is their key goal in their war on terror. Bush said in a 
 
150 Vanhanen, Tatu: Democratization, p.189 
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speech in 2003: “We support the advance of freedom in the Middle East, because it is our funding 
principle, and because it is in our national interest. The hateful ideology of terrorism is shaped and 
nurtured and protected by oppressive regimes. Free nations, in contrast, encourage creativity and 
tolerance and enterprise. And in those free nations, the appeal of extremism withers away.”153  
Democracy promotion has not always been on the US agenda for the Middle 
East, but when the status quo in the region was not stable anymore after September 
11th, the United States was determined to push for democratization, regardless of the 
consequences, US diplomats William Burns and Lorne Craner asserted in a 
conference on Islam and democracy.154 However, the diplomats also admitted that 
democracy in the Muslim world would perhaps make it more difficult for the United 
States to pursue its interests in the region. Many Muslims remain skeptical and 
cynical to the US interest in democracy in the Middle East, as democracy promotion 
never was the Americans’ interest in the past.  
Certain examples of the selective nature of the American democratic offensive 
give good reasons to question the US intentions of democratizing Middle East. The 
United States has had an 80-year old relationship to the autocratic kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia without lifting the attention to the democratic conditions of the country. Why 
have they not demanded the Saudi regime to respect human and civil rights, when 
Afghanistan and Iraq are obliged to? The Saudi regime has long been an important 
ally of the US, but they have never pressured the kingdom to democratize or 
liberalize. Today’s pressure for democratic reforms in Saudi Arabia continues to be 
very modest.155A similar case we find with regard to the oppressive regime in Egypt 
and its relations to the US. Egypt is on of the biggest recipient of US aid after Israel 
in the Middle East,156 and received more than a billion US dollars in military 
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assistance in 2006.157 This despite the fact that the Egyptian government rules under 
an Emergency Law that has a severely restricted freedom of expression, belief and 
association. Many human rights abuses have been reported in Egypt, human rights 
organizations are being closed down and thousands of people are being detained 
without charge under the law, according to Human Rights Watch.158 When 
questioned about the need for political reform and the issue of human rights in Egypt 
shortly after 9/11, US ambassador David Welch responded: “Egypt is our friend, and 
we do not put pressure on friends.”159 The Egyptian government took an active 
antiterrorism stand and was therefore welcomed as an important US ally in fighting 
terrorism.  
Other authoritarian regimes do not have such a positive relationship with the 
United States, and President Bush labeled both Iran and North Korea along with Iraq 
as “the axis of evil”. Libya, Syria, Sudan and Cuba where not considered much 
better.160 The international community’s efforts of undermining authoritarian regimes 
can be a potentially positive step in the long-term development of democracy, but it 
can hardly be predicted to serve its purpose when it is done in such a selective 
manner. When other authoritarian regimes gain international recognition and 
economic support, a common trend has emerged where specific authoritarian regimes 
are directly or indirectly encouraged by Western democratic patrons. Morocco, 
Jordan, Qatar and Kuwait are all close allies with the US, and crucial to US interests. 
One may suspect that geopolitical advantages, access to cheap oil and rich markets 
overrun the idealistic claim of promoting good governance.  
However, the US is not alone in indirectly supporting Arab authoritarianism. 
The Norwegian government holds shares in a company that has trade relations with 
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the theocratic oppressive regime in Iran while Norwegian politicians at the same time 
publicly disapprove of anti-democratic states and authoritarian ideologies.161 
Norwegian companies also do business with Morocco in the occupied territories of 
Western Sahara, which means they indirectly support the occupation and directly 
deprive Sahrawians’ of their right to decide over their own resources.162 If the 
Western powers’ strive for democratic expansion in the Middle East is going to be 
perceived as credible among the recipients of democracy, the West’s commitment to 
democratic values such as freedom, equality and human rights should includes all 
Arab states, not only a few chosen ones. The Libyan intellectual Dr. Mohammad Al-
Houni goes as far as classifying the friendly relations between the US and various 
Arab countries in the past as one of the main motivations behind Arab and Islamic 
terrorism.163 With the international support of some Western countries through public 
friendship or trade relations, authoritarian regimes can to a larger extent gain 
legitimacy of their own regimes. The group of oppressive regimes who are not 
enjoying beneficial Western friendships can be subjected to international boycotts or 
exclusions of other kinds that in turn might contribute to reinforce their hostility 
towards the West.  
Arabs and Muslims have several reasons to be skeptical towards the US 
administration’s policy pronouncements about bringing political and religious 
freedom and even the attempt to create a liberal democracy in Iraq.164 The Iraqis are 
not free to choose whatever form of political system they want, former Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld has maintained.165 The US will not allow for an Islamic 
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state in Iraq. Yet, according to Khan, democratization will lead to Islamization. And 
when Islamists are in power, they will be able to resist US influence in the region 
with legitimate means. This is not an outcome the US can risk, Khan says, so US 
foreign policy has for years in fact been one of the barriers to democracy in the 
Middle East. This policy is difficult to reverse, and so is the Muslim skepticism. 
Khan suggests that “in order for the United States to facilitate the democratization of 
the Middle East, it must gain the trust and cooperation of Arabs and Muslims in the 
region.”166 Even if Arabs fear US intentions, the superpower will play an important 
role in future political development in their region. 
I have discussed whether or not the US, and to a lesser extent other Western 
powers, have credible intentions when claiming they want to democratize the Middle 
East. The intentions of the West become problematic when seen in relation to the 
difference of democratizing for the sake of the inhabitants well being or pursuing 
own, national interests. I will now go on to look at what kind of political government 
the inhabitants of the region wish for themselves. 
4.2.2 Do Muslims really want democracy? 
Many voices hold on to the view that Muslims and the Arab world are not 
ready to adapt to democracy. Muslims are often assumed to have an instinctive 
hostile attitude to the democratic idea. British-American historian Bernard Lewis says 
that religious neo-Islam and liberal democracy is clearly conflicting because the so 
called ‘fundamentalists’ regard liberal democracy with “contempt as a corrupt and 
corrupting form of government.”167 According to Lewis, Islamists are at best willing 
to see democracy as a possibility for them to gain power. However, they are not 
likely to embrace democratic practices and give away their power if they lose an 
election.  
 
166 Ibid. p.82 
167 Lewis, Bernard: "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview" in Journal of Democracy 7.2, 1996, p.54 
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Surveys conducted by Pippa Norris and Ron Inglehart revealed that Muslims 
overwhelmingly prefer democracy to any other form of government.168 There is 
nothing in Islam or in Muslim practice that is fundamentally opposed to democracy, 
justice, freedom, fairness, equality or tolerance. 169 Few Muslims reject democracy 
because they resent the West, and they do not allow the West to have the ownership 
of this universal value, Khan argues. The hundreds of millions of Muslims who go to 
the voting polls in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Malaysia do so because they believe in 
the democratic ideal. There are more nations in the Muslim world that claim to be 
democratic than Islamic170 and one out of four majority-Muslim countries has 
democratically elected governments.171 Given that these findings represent the reality 
of democratic practice in large parts of the Muslim world, it is possible to claim that 
there is little dispute between Islam and democracy for a large number of Muslims. 
With regard to the Arabic Middle East, where only a minority of the Muslim electoral 
democracies is situated, the compatibility of Islam and democratic practice is in need 
of further recognition.  
 According to a global survey conducted by the international poll centre 
Gallup, more than 90 % of the 1, 3 billion Muslims in the world are against terrorism 
and for women’s rights and democracy.172 The survey also shows that 93 % of 
Muslims are moderate, and that they are concerned with improved relations with the 
West. Their critique of the West comes forth in the responses to what they least 
esteem in the Western societies, being what Muslims perceive as moral decay and 
breakdown of traditional values. On the other hand, the majority of Muslims admire 
 
168 See Mufti, Siraj: “Muslims Love Democracy,” Muslim Democrat, Vol 4, No.2,  2002, p.1 and Pew Research Center: 
“Views of a changing world”, 2003 
169 Khan, Muqtedar: ”Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy” in Middle East Policy, Vol.X, 2003, p.85 
170 Ibid. 
171 Haass, Richard N.: “Towards Greater Democracy in the Muslim World” in The Washington Quarterly 26:3, 2003,  
p.141  
172 The survey is one of the most extensive of its kind, conducted from 2001 to 2007 researching attitudes among 50 000 
questioned Muslims in 35 countries.   
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democracy, gender equality and the technology in Europe and US. The media forgets 
to cover these views along with the extremist group of political radical Muslims.  
Gallup Centre for Muslim studies recently published a book called Who Speaks for 
Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think. The book aims to change the negative 
image the media usually depicts of Muslims. Historian of religion and expert on 
Islam, Kari Vogt, confirms that the findings of the survey are accurate. 173 Research 
institutions have long shown that the majority of Muslims have moderate views, but 
the media nevertheless choose to focus solely on the radical Islam that indeed exists, 
but it is not the whole story, Vogt explains. The media thus becomes a political actor 
contributing to the inhospitable picture of Muslims dominating in the West. The 
media can play an important role in the public debate and contribute in the framing of 
people’s opinions and perceptions. 
The British Muslim Iffit Qureshi writes in a feature article about what she calls 
the selective democracy of the West, that there is no critical reflection in the way the 
West perceives Islamists.174 Many still incorrectly think Islamist despise Western 
modernity, freedom of speech and democracy. Qureshi says we have a responsibility 
to de-mystify the stereotypical images of Muslims and Westerners have of each other. 
One of the challenges of improving the relations between the West and the Arab 
world is to bring to a halt the perpetual “demonizing” of the other through media, 
political rhetoric and misperceptions of the other’s values, ideas and traditions. 
Muslims participating in the Gallup survey around the world, encourages the West to 
improve relations with Muslim societies by moderating their views towards Muslims 
and respect Islam. It is conceivable that we need to get rid of the misperceptions 
about Muslims in the West and about Westerners in the Arab world. Recognizing the 
importance in correcting each other’s perception, will not alone improve democratic 
 
173 Saghir, Noshin: “Muslimenes sanne ansikt” in Ny Tid , No 14, 11-17 April 2008, p. 25. 
174 Qureshi, Iffti: ”Vestens selektive demokrati” in Aftenposten, February 10, 2008 
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relations, but it might be a beginning of such development. Hence, it is a mutual 
responsibility of both Arabs and Westerners to take the necessary steps.  
4.3 Negative tendencies 
What then, is left to say about the tendencies towards political change in the 
Arab region? I will briefly summarize the negative tendencies that do not point in 
direction of political reform. Democratically elected leaders continue to be a rare 
species in the Middle East. Freedom of speech, independent media and transparent, 
competitive and free elections are not frequent in any Arab country. The Cairo-
meeting where so many Arab information ministers agreed to restrict the freedom of 
speech is a notable setback for Arab democracy. Another hinder to democracy is the 
increased support for extremist, religious movements, terrorism and the global jihad-
movement with strong anti-American sentiments. The extremists’ perception of the 
West, especially the US as the imperialist and hegemonic enemy is a motivation for 
anti-democratic movements.  
4.4 Positive tendencies 
There are at the same time several positive outlooks for the future of Arab 
democracy. I have already pointed out the increase in national elections, although 
their effect on democracy is disputed. More and more Arabs have been given the 
right to vote in recent years and gender equality is on the agenda. Women’s rights are 
improving and female participation in politics is increasing. Islamic reforms are on 
the move with re-interpretations of the Quran discovering its democratic potential 
through reformers like Soroush who is promoting an Islamic version of democracy. 
Recent surveys show that the majority of Muslims are in favor of democracy. 
Another positive outlook is that the international climate is not favorable to overt 
authoritarian rule and has a growing tendency to do something about it. This may 
open up for the possibility that the West have an incentive to start a new and 
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improved way of thinking about democratization. All attempts at democratization, 
even if they fail, can form a part of history and the collective memory of communities 
and contribute to democratization in the longer term.  
4.5 Final remarks 
The authors of Who Speaks for Islam?, John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, 
concluded that conflict between the West and the Muslim world is not inevitable. The 
conflict is about politics, not about principles, they concluded. Chapters 3 and 4 have 
presented material which might suggest that the majority of Muslims does not find 
essential democratic and Islamic principles irreconcilable. It does not necessarily 
have to be a dispute between Islam and democracy, even the first Islamic state 
established by the prophet Muhammad, was a multicultural and multireligious 
federation ruled by consensus of those who governed. The constitution established 
the importance of consent and cooperation for governance, and treated Muslims and 
non-Muslims as equal citizens of the Islamic state with equal rights and duties. The 
Islamic state can serve as a model for developing modern Islamic democracies. And it 
does not necessarily have to be as morally liberal and value pluralist as the liberal 
democratic model.  
The unwillingness of Arab leaders to implement liberal democratic practices in 
their respective countries could be explained with the fact that it is not democracy per 
se they have a problem with, but rather the principles founded in liberalism. That the 
state should be guided by liberal principles and operate with a pluralist conception of 
good and be impartial in moral issues, is challenging in the religiously influenced 
societies of the Middle East. Moreover, as long as the basic principles of democracy 
are compatible, such as freedom, equality before the law and consensus rule, there is 
reason to believe that the ideological transfer of democracy will be possible to. 
  
 
76
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
5.1 Summary of main ideas 
What are the challenges of exporting the Western classical view of liberal 
democracy to the Middle Eastern context? In the conclusion of the thesis I will return 
to the main research question and the sub questions by summarizing the answers 
provided in the preceding chapters.  
1) What separates liberal democracy from alternative understandings of 
democracy? This has been answered by looking at what an inclusive definition of 
liberal democracy entails compared to a minimal definition including little more than 
the presence of an election. The theoretical foundation of classical liberalism rooted 
on John Stuart Mill presents the freedom of the individual as the highest value and is 
based on a negative concept of freedom. The modern political liberalism, building on 
John Rawls, reflects the core values of modern liberal democracies. Those values are 
impartiality, tolerance, liberty and the freedom of the individual. For a state to be 
guided by these principles, it should accommodate religious and ethnic pluralism by a 
secularization of politics, the protection of minority rights through law, a democratic 
constitution and emphasize the freedom of expression and the freedom of belief. To 
many Arabs this liberal state is perceived as a threat to their societies when 
democracy promoters imply that liberal democracy is the only legitimate, good 
society.   
2) What is the position of democracy in the Middle East? An account of the 
poor state of democracy and the vast illiberalism in the Arab world gave a response to 
this, ending in a discussion and analysis of the compatibility of democracy and the 
religion and culture of Islam. This is manifested in the hostility towards Western 
values many Arabs possess. They hold their culture and religion highly esteemed, and 
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perceive democratization as a threat of Westernization and a decline in their moral, 
social behavior and traditional values. 
3) What are the future prospects for change in the Middle East? This question 
has, on the basis of my findings, shown to be the most difficult question to answer. 
Several Arab philosophers suggest an Islamic reform to accept democracy and argue 
that the inherent values and ideals of Islam are perfectly compatible. However, 
political Islam and the extremist interpretations of its radical adherents postpone the 
process of initiating political reforms. The lack of political will and democratic 
understanding of the incumbents in power slows down the pace of reforms.  
The main challenges of exporting the classical liberal democracy to the Middle 
Eastern contexts can accordingly be seen as the different conceptions Arabs and 
Westerners have of democracy and freedom, something which is only strengthened 
by the misperceptions they have of each other. I have therefore argued that we should 
reconceptualize, or rather de-Westernize, democracy in order for it to fit into the 
Middle Eastern context and not be seen as a demoralizing, hegemonic concept of 
Western imperialism. There is reason to believe, according to recent global surveys, 
that the majority of Muslims embrace their conception of the democratic ideal. I 
postulate that an Islamic version of democracy can be a good way of reconciling the 
differences between the West and the Arab world, where the liberal ideals of 
individualism and secularism are not given such a central position in the foundations 
of the state as in the West. Further research on the possibilities of establishing an 
Islamic, modern democracy rooted on the model of first Islamic state adjusted to the 
criteria of democracy175 emphasizing civil liberties, human rights and political 
freedoms would be highly enlightening. 
 
175 Such as listed by Robert A. Dahl in 2.2.1 
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5.2 Policy implications 
It seems clear that the strategies for democracy promotion in the Middle East 
must change somehow. The internal legitimacy for democracy must be home-grown 
and rooted in the people, it cannot be externally imposed. The liberal ideal of the 
individual’s right to self-determination is also transferred to sovereign states’ right to 
autonomy in international politics, when the world is seen as a community of liberal 
societies. According to this analogy,176 every sovereign state must then have the right 
to independently choose its own domestic politics. The Arab states themselves must 
initiate any major political changes in their region. Furthermore, the responsibility 
does not lie solely with the leaders or with the people. Democracy promotion does 
not just have a top-down or a bottom-up strategy. The bottom-up strategy 
presupposes an already functioning civil society, and that is not always the case. A 
top-down strategy is difficult to perform when the will of the leaders is weak or 
absent, and when they have little support in the people. Creating democracies 
requires not just a favorable global order, but collective action and radical processes 
of social transformation within nation states.177 For democracy to be successfully 
consolidated it requires more than political changes; democracy must become an 
integrated part of the society, even in the culture and in the mentality of the people. 
The Libyan Dr. Muhammad Al-Houni calls for a change of Arab mentality in 
order for the region to accept democracy. The Arabs must understand that the world 
has changed and choose between the “Western Civilization and the legacy of the 
Middle Ages.”178 That entails to abandon the patriarchal Bedouin values, challenge 
the interpretation of Islam by religious fundamentalists and create law abiding states. 
 
176 See Michael Walzer:  Just and Unjust Wars, p.58-59 for his use of the ’domestic analogy’ comparing a society of states 
to a society of individuals in his theory of aggression.  
177 Grugel, Jean: Democratization. A critical introduction, p.247 
178 Dankowitz, A: “Libyan intellectual Dr. Muhammad Al-Houni: The Arabs must choose between Western Civilization 
and the legacy of the Middle Ages” in Inquiry and Analysis series No.240, 2005 
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The old concept of Jihad 179 is no longer justifiable in the present reality, Al- Houni 
argues, and further states that an attempt to implement the medieval religious laws is 
bound to fail and it will only postpone the realization of democracy in Arab society. 
180 The Arabs have only one of two options, according to Al-Houni; the Western 
civilization or the Arab religious legacy of the era similar to the European Middle 
Ages. Continuing to uphold their own cultural institutions will only do themselves 
harm, says Al-Houni, and encourages a stronger tie with the West in order for the 
Arab way of thinking to become “a philosophy of life and freedom and not one of 
death and hatred.”181 
Al-Houni has the view that the Arab mentality is so deeply rooted in medieval 
legacies that it does not adjust to the modern world and is not receptive to 
conceptions of democracy. He uses strong formulations to express his point regarding 
what the Arabs believe and do not believe. It is not in the capacity of this thesis to 
suggest what the Arab mentality is or what Arabs want. Neither has it been my 
intention to come up with exhaustive causal explanations of the problem of 
democracy in the Arab world. I have simply focused on a selection of some of the 
most significant explanations for why democracy has not yet been consolidated in the 
Arab world, mainly from a historical, economic an ideological perspective. The 
ideological explanations have been particularly important, as I have defined 
democracy promotion as an ideological value transfer. I have suggested that one 
explanation for the challenging consolidation of liberal democracy in Arab countries 
is the separation of state and religion in liberal democracy. The liberal state is 
pluralistic and secular, while religion has a central place in the Arab state and a 
complete secularization is low esteemed.  Another possible explanation for why 
democracy promotion in the Middle East has not succeeded this far, is that the 
 
179 Jihad means both inner and outer struggle for the sake of Allah, and it is the use of Jihad as an attack of others Al-Houni 
criticizes.  
180 Dankowitz, A: “Libyan intellectual Dr. Muhammad Al-Houni: The Arabs must choose between Western Civilization 
and the legacy of the Middle Ages” in Inquiry and Analysis series No.240, 2005 
181 Ibid. 
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inhospitable perception Arabs have of the West makes them reluctant to welcome 
Western reforms. A consequence of this is that Arabs get the wrong impression of 
democracy and fear the whole project of democratization being nothing but 
Westernization. A third explanation is that democratic reforms rarely transform an 
authoritarian society when externally imposed. Reforms have to be accepted and 
grown from within a country in order to be successful. Based on what is presented in 
this thesis and the limited scope of this paper, I do not have the sufficient grounds to 
draw any conclusions with regard to the prospects for Arab political change, or point 
out broad implications for foreign policy making. However, I have raised several 
important questions and discussions which are crucial for the practitioners of 
democracy promotion and policy makers to consider and reflect upon. The 
divergence between the West and the Middle East is explained both politically and 
principally. My contribution to the debate is that if we redefine democracy in such a 
way that it shows not to lead to a decline of the moral in the society or pose a threat to 
Muslims’ faith and culture, the chances of succeeding in consolidating democracy are 
higher. Arab and Western scholars would gain an expanded understanding of what 
democracy can entail through an enlightening debate and dialogue about the positive 
effects of democratic governance on the one hand, and of secularization on the other. 
For Arabs to lose their fears of democratization simultaneously being a project of 
Westernization, it would be in order to completely reconceptualize democracy in a 
way that makes it less ‘liberal’ and less ‘Western’, and to separate democratization 
from liberalization is one step in the right direction. 
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